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[Author's note: On Thursday, January 20, 1983, only a few
days prior to press time and beller than two years after the second
Mount Laurel case had been argued, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in a unanimous 270 page opinion, reaffirmed the principles of
the original Mount Laurel decision in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, Doc. No. A-35/36/172
(N.J. Jan; 21, 1983).
It appears that in order to reach the desired unanimity, the jus
tices of the court agreed to defer to the New Jersey State Develop
ment Guideplan, an executive branch document, to determine
whether a local government unit has an obligation to deal through its
zoning laws or otherwise to provide for low-income housing. The
"otherwise" that hadpreviously only been hinted at. was spelled out
forcibly by the court's suggestions of tax rebate, density bonus, or
expert assistance.in the seeking of government financing. In addi
tion, judicial expertise is to be gained by an internal court reorgani
zation in which certain judges will be assigned to exclusionary zoning
cases. This ifffort is to be supplemented by special masters who will
presumably have planning expertise.
It is not anticipated that this, the latest chapter in the Mount
Laurel saga, will have any more signtficant impact than the original
Mount Laurel decision. It is, however, a step in the direction toward
• Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law; B.S., Southwest Texas
State College, 1950; M.A., University of Iowa, 1951; LL.B., Baylor University, College,
1956. Professor Lowrey is currently involved in exclusionary zoning litigation in the
Philadelphia area.
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the court's acceptance ofassistancefrom branches ofthe government
that are beller suited to cope with the problem as perceived)

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article is dedicated to the principle, simply stated, that I
cannot tell you what it is but I know it when I see it. l This philoso
phy, perhaps more consonant with pornography litigation than land
use law, might well be related to the concept of what exclusionary
zoning is, but would even more appropriately be addressed to the
highly abstract and related question of what constitutes fair-share.
Alternatively, the article might be dedicated to the concept: "Rus
mihi dulce sub urbe est"-"To me, the country on the outskirts of
the city is sweet."2
The catalyst for this effort was a suggestion that the impact of
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laure/3
be assessed and if not followed extensively that the possible reasons
should be explored. Though Mount Laurel has probably received
more press and legal publication coverage than any other exclusion
ary zoning case, the short answer as to impact is that it has thus far
had only moderate impact at best on the decisional process outside
the State of New Jersey.
Once the confusion of exclusionary zoning is delineated suffi
ciently to adequately address it, focus will be on the reasons for less
rather than more impact. It should be acknowledged that inter
spersed with the reasons as to why the multifarious doctrines have
not been followed more than they have been, will be reasons why in
the opinion of the author or others, they should not be followed.
Henceforth, liberty will be taken with reality, and exclusionary zon
. ing will be referred to in the singular in spite of its multifarious
nature.
The focus will be primarily on the most common variety, large
lot exclusionary zoning. Mobile homes and the uniquely related
Pennsylvania law calling for all expectable types of housing is in
cluded. Control of group homes, and the multitude of other land
control mechanisms such as stringent utility codes and permit and
subdivision fees as well as other direct assessments or exactions are
not generally addressed because they do not comprise the main
l. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. State ex rel Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 287, 181 N.E.2d 905, 912
(1960) (quoting Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrams).
3. 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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thrust of the Mount Laurel doctrine or the focal point of exclusion
ary zoning litigation. Likewise, exclusion of business, minimum
floor space cases, and those decisions based on just compensation
under the fifth amendment or police power considerations having no
relevance to regional responsibilities or people of lesser income that
are sometimes cited as exclusionary zoning decisions,4 are not gener
ally dealt with.
Some judgment, easily subject to difference of opinion, has to be
exercised in determining whether many decisions are concerned with
exclusion of people or housing types within the context of this arti
cle. The later decisions do tend more towards recognition of re
gional responsibilities and interests of those of lesser income. Either
4. There is some minimal dissimilarity at least between minimal floor space cases
and exclusion of business as opposed to exclusion of people. And it is probable that
some jurisdictions will permit large lot zoning while proscribing exclusion of legitimate
businesses.
The exclusion of businesses where there is adequate commercial service available in
nearby municipalities has been sustained. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett,
221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Cadoux v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294
A.2d 582, cerl. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972); McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454
S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970); Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.
1963). As in Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So.2d 683 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1964) and Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So. 2d 321 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1962) it
has been recognized that exclusion of businesses can be unconstitutional. Exclusion of
trailer parks has been voided because they constitute a lawful business enterprise as well
as on egalitarian and other grounds discussed herein. See, e.g. , High Meadows Park, Inc.
v. City of Aurora, 112 Ill. App. 2d 220, 250 N.E.2d 517 (1969).
Many cases which have been cited as exclusionary zoning decisions, though rele
vant, are insufficiently so as to be classified as such. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917) (putely racial); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956
(1st Cir. 1972); English v. Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (ur
ban renewal); Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567
(1971); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257,146 N.E.2d 35 (1957); Warren v. Mu
nicipal Officers, 431 A.2d 624 (Me. 1981); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery
County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346
Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 237,
326 N.E.2d 922 (1975); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378
(1952); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 A.D.2d 701, 174 N.Y.S.2d 283
(1958); Franmor Realty Corp. v. Village of Old Westbury, 280 A.D. 945,116 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1952); Dilliard v. Village of North Hills, 195 Misc. 875, 91 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 68 Ohio St. 2d 156,429 N.E.2d 159 (1981);
State ex rel Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1960).
Typical of closely related large lot decisions that do not quite reach the exclusion
issue is Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 602, 195 N.E.2d 341, 344 (1964)
(citing Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 564,42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1942», in which the
court invalidated a 100,000 sq. ft. minimum lot size as not being a valid exercise of the
police power where the only justification was enhanCement of "living and recreational
amenities." Id at 604, 195 N.E.2d at 345. The court's decision was based on the rights of
the owners, and not on those of third parties.
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consideration relates to exclusion. It matters little for definitional
purPoses whether the poor within or those from without are being
excluded.
No effort will be made to place in perspective relevant legisla
tion almost all of which has followed the handing down oftheMount
Laurel decision. It is noted that the cities of Los Angeles and Palo
Alto and Orange County, California, Fairfax County, Virginia, and
the states of California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon and New
Jersey have all passed relevant legislation. s To some limited extent
the 1977 amendment to the Community Development Act6 is also
relevant insofar as it mandates that housing assistance plans for re
cipients of community development funding give consideration only
to those from outside the community who might desire to work
there. This is a retreat from the initial act which implicitly at least
required consideration of those who might want to live there for
whatever reason. 7
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING--PROBLEMS OF
DEFINITION

The analytical framework for any definition must involve an
understanding of exclusionary zoning as handled by the courts, be
cause it is a court made doctrine. An understanding of the definition
involves the interrelationship of at least three factors. First, atten
tion has to be given to the type of facts that give rise to a legal con
clusion of exclusionary zoning. Second, the legal theory applied to
those facts to reach a conclusion of exclusionary zoning has to be
addressed. Third, a reasonable understanding of the phenomena re
quires a recognition of the different remedies flowing, whether logi
cally or not, from the different facts and theories. It may well be that
the last factor could be better described as a recognition of different
results flowing from different jurisdictions because the difference in
results can be measured more by the sociological perspective of each
state's judiciary than by any legal theory utilized.
5. Coverage of the subject of legislative intervention in California is found in EI~
lickson, The Irony of "lnC/usionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167 (1981). The article
reflects the idea that exclusionary legislative zoning has been counterproductive there. A
broader perspective is found in Rose, From ,Ire Legislatures, 3 REAL EsTATE L.J. 176
(1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (Supp. IV 1980).
7. The employment amendment inserted after the phrase, "expected to reside in
the community," the phrase, "as a result of existing or projected employment opportuni
ties in the community." 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Facts

Fact patterns resulting in findings of exclusionary zoning such
as those addressed here can with reasonable accuracy be classified
under two categories. The first is exclusion of people and the second
exclusion of types of housing. The latter, excepting perhaps mobile
homes, is unique to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The two
interrelate to some degree. Exclusion of people is found primarily
through large lot zoning. Exclusion of mobile homes or of types of
housing mayor may not relate to exclusion of people. Types of
housing that might be protected are twins, townhouses, atrium
houses and mobile homes.
B. Theory
It is clear that no single theory of recovery has been relied on

exclusively. But the basis for relief has almost always revolved
around a state constitution or the police power, primarily the latter.
The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to the federal
constitution is often intermingled, as well as a vaguely articulated
concept of substantive due process.
The police power, of course, is that power retained by the states
rather than delegated to the federal government; any action pursuant
to it must bear some substantial relationship to health, safety, wel
fare, or morals. 8 If the court concludes that the requisite relationship
does not exist, then the conclusion is often articulated in terms of
unreasonableness. The power is also often couched in terms of un
constitutionality without recitation of a controlling constitutional
provision, almost as if to exceed the police power is to exceed the
constitution. 9 The finding may be that the restriction on the use of
private property is so unreasonable that it is beyond the police
power, though the restriction does not rise to the level of a violation
of the fifth amendment as a taking. The courts often find that the
exercise of the power in an exclusionary manner is unreasonable be
cause it does not relate to the welfare of the poor. lO In some in
stances it is not clear which poor are being spoken of and sometimes,
most often of late, the category includes those poor from outside the
municipality who might choose to live there for whatever reason. In
Pennsylvania especially, it is very probable that none of the plaintiffs
are poor or even cited as such.
8. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
9. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Jd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
10. 67 N.J. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 727-28 (1975).
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In other situations, the taking provision of the fifth amendment
is successfully invoked to defeat a zoning ordinance. Though the
rationale of the court mayor may not relate to exclusion, such deci
sions still invalidate large lot zoning. Most often the cases reflect
considerations germane to all three principles without clearly de
lineating which, if any, is the dominant or controlling consideration.
Perhaps the most common combination in recent years is a con
sideration of unreasonableness based on restraint of private property
rights and of regional interests that have not been considered or pro
vided for. The word "poor" is used, and must be read, with the un
derstanding that it relates to those of lesser income who mayor may
not be technically poor. In Pennsylvania it could, if regarded as en
compassing only the plaintiffs, even refer to wealthy individuals who
desire to live in multiunit housing in a given township as opposed to
a single-family detached dwelling on a large plot of ground. But,
developers bring virtually all Pennsylvania actions.

c.

Remedy

There have been two basic approaches to remedy. One involves
only site-specific relief for the developer. This approach requires the
municipality to respond to a successful exclusionary challenge by re
vising its zoning ordinance to permit the developer to build the type
of housing proposed by him at the density proposed by him. Most
states, including Pennsylvania, have gone no further. I I The second
approach is to require the municipality to revise its entire zoning
ordinance so as to correct all exclusionary defects. This probably
involves, as well, site-specific relief for the plaintiff. New Jersey has
adopted the second approach. 12
In Pennsylvania, site-specific relief is the entire remedy. The
courts do not direct revision of zoning ordinances in the general pub
lic interest except to the extent, if any, that relief to the plaintiff can
be said to coincide with public welfare. \3 After a given developer is
allowed to build largely as he sees fit, there is nothing in the court
decree to force any other response from the municipality. It can
otherwise remain exclusionary until the next challenge. Whether a
number of challenges will be sufficient to make an ordinance im
pregnable against further attack is not clear, though it is assumed
11. In re Girsb, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
12. See, e.g., 67 N.J. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734 (1975).
13. See, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. 504, 533,
215 A.2d 597, 612-13 (1965).
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that if the township has adopted a number of curative amendments
sufficient to purge its ordinance ofjudicially proscribed exclusion, no
further challenges will be successful.
A shorthand definition of the substantive violation offered by
one recognized authority is: "The term 'exclusionary zoning' as it is
used herein means land use control regulations which singly or in
concert tend to exclude persons of low or moderate income from the
zoning municipality." 14 If the words "and commonly accepted hous
ing types" were added to "persons of low or moderate income" the
definition would also be adequate for Pennsylvania. But, regardless·
of how the substantive law is perceived, impact can only be ade
quately assessed in terms of remedy.
The problem remaining, as with almost all definitions, is that it
does not recognize that virtually all land use controls "tend to ex
clude persons of low or moderate income" no matter what the nature
of the limitation. This is because zoning, subdivision regulations,
health standards and safety measures tend to make an area or a
home more desirable and therefore more expensive. The cost of liv
ing in a desirable home or area is determined by the degree of desir
ability. The quality and the price interrelate and escalate together.
Perhaps the only totally accurate definition of exclusionary zoning
would be that zoning which has been found by the judiciary to be so.
Or, an equally unhelpful definition might be formed by putting the
word ''unduly'' before the word "tend" in the definition quoted
above.
It might be worth bearing in mind that by either public or pri
vate device everyone but the most wealthy are excluded on the basis
of wealth from some place and even the wealthy are sometimes ex
cluded for social reasons.
However defined, there remain problems of definition or under
standing as to what exclusionary zoning is and as to what Mount
Laurel stands for that might account for the widespread assumption
as to the significance of the case. The problem appears to be that of
perception of the remedy provided for in Mount Laurel.
The case has often been credited with an affirmative action
stance beyond its express language. For instance, one commentator
has stated that "[p]robably the most significant attempt to formulate
a new standard of review was the New Jersey Supreme Court's deci
sion in Mount Laurel, which required a suburb~ community to pro
vide adequate housing for a judicially determined percentage of the
14. 2 R.

ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§ 8.02 (1968).
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region's low-income population."ls Of course, though there was
strong affirmative action language l6 easily susceptible to such a read
ing, it is now clear that Mount Laurel did not require the township to
provide any housing at all, only to rezone for multiunit housing.
So, when a definition is used in order to give some sense of clar
ity in determining what may have been followed, it must be done
with the understanding that the Mount Laurel model differs from the
Pennsylvania model, that both may differ in significant respects from
all others, and that numerous analytical strands are involved.
III.

IMPACT OF MOUNT LAUREL

Although the impact of Mount Laurel may be somewhat uncer
tain, it is clear that not only was it not seminal, but its 1975 date
makes New Jersey one of the last states to recognize the doctrine.
When Mount Laurel was decided in 1975, at least ten jurisdic
tions had already expressed some concept of exclusionary zoning in
volving large lot zoning or mobile homes: New York,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Connecticut, Virginia, Pennsylvania, MaryIS. Note, ExclUSionary Zoning in California: A Statutory Mechanism for Judicial
Non-deference, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1155 (1979).
16. Mount Laurel's affirmative action language may have been misleading:
It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises
for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use
regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live
within its boundaries.
67 N.l. at 179,336 A.2d at 728.
By way of summary, what we have said comes down to this. As a developing
municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations, make realistically
possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all
categories of people who may desire to live there, of course including those of
low and moderate income.
Id. at 187,336 A.2d at 731-32. "We have in mind that there is at least a moral obligation
in a municipality to establish a local housing agency pursuant to state law to provide
housing for its resident poor now living in dilapidated, unhealthy quarters." Id. at 192,
336 A.2d at 734.
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use regulations,
presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of
housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of
the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its
regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of
the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need
therefor.
Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
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land, California, Michigan, and New Hampshire,l1 Though the
zealousness and fervor with which the decisions were rendered were
not the same and the outcomes differed, there was, excepting Penn
sylvania's housing approach, no essential difference in broad ab
stract principle. A common bond has been that neither then nor now
does there appear to have been any court willing to acknowledge the
right of a municipality under the police power to exclude people
without limitation. IS
A. Prior Decisions

Probably the first state to recognize a doctrine of exclusionary
zoning was New Yorkin the 1931 decision Fox Meadow Estates, Inc.
v. Cu/ley}9 Exclusion of apartment buildings from one residential
sector was sustained where apartments were permitted in another
sector and the municipality had "provided for future development as
far as could reasonably be foreseen."2o A close reading of the case
leaves the impression that the primary focus was on reasonableness
in general rather than exclusion of people. It may barely qualify as
an exclusionary zoning case, but it was some forty-four years before
Mount Laurel was decided in 1975. The issue of exclusion was
squarely raised by a dissent in a 1952 New Jersey minimum floor
17. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), appeal dis
missed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 lli. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35
(1957); County Commissioners v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Simon v.
Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich.
App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1971); Fox Meadow Estates, Inc. v. Culley, 233 A.D.
250,252 N.Y.S. 178 (App. Div. 1931),qd'd, 261 N.Y. 506,185 N.E. 714 (1933); National
Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of
County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
18. In Berenson v. Town of Newcastle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975), the court stated "Florida courts have upheld the validity of exclu
sionary zoning provisions without any qualifications. (Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke
Shores, 161 So.2d 683 [Fla. App.); Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Is., 142 So. 2d 321 [Fla.
App.).)" Id at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680. The author's reading of
these cases does not support the assertion that exclusionary zoning provisions were sus
tained without any qualification. Rather, the courts simply refused to supplant the legis
lative judgment. They did not sustain the power to absolutely exclude, but rather
sustained exclusion under the facts of the case. There is no doubt that the perspective as
to judicial deference is different, but there is no expressed difference of black letter law.
19. 233 A.D. 250, 252 N.Y.S. 178 (1931), qd'd, 261 N.Y. 506, 185 N.E. 714 (1933).
20. Id at 250, 252 N.Y.S. at 179.
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area case entitled Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne. 21
Perhaps the first decision to precisely address an exclusionary
doctrine, including regional considerations, was the 1942 Massachu
setts decision of Simon v. Town ofNeedham. 22 One-acre zoning was
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power against charges
that it unduly excluded persons of more limited income from the
township:
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a
barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who
desire to live there and who are able and willing to erect homes
upon lots upon which fair and reasonable restrictions have been
imposed nor for the purpose of protecting the large estates that are
already located in the district. The strictly local interests of the
town must yield if it appears that they are plainly in conflict with
the general interests of the public at large, and in such instances
the interests "of the municipality would not be allowed to stand in
'
the way."23

Although it might be urged that the language "thrifty and respecta
ble citizens" restricts the scope of the decision, it is not believed that
the language detracts from the clear pronouncement of regional re
sponsibility, as in Mount Laurel, to zone in relation to the general
welfare.
In the 1957 Illinois decision, Honeck v. County ofCook,24 five
acre zoning was sustained on the ground that there was room for a
fair difference of opinion against charges that the zoning was confis
catory and unreasonable. Twenty 1000 square-foot lots were avail
able. There were strong overtones of elitist zoning considerations.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in 1959, though finding a
legitimate exercise of the police power in up-zoning over 4,000 acres
from two to four acres per unit of housing, recognized the principle
21. 10 N.J. 165,89 A.2d 693 (1952) (Oliphant, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 344
U.S. 919 (1953).
Following close on the heels of Lionshead Lake the court sanctioned against charges
that it exceeded the police power, the right to establish a minimum lot area of five acres
in what was then a rural municipality. Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, II N.J. 194,
93 A.2d 378 (1952). One-half acre lots were available in the township. Neither outsiders
nor the poor were mentioned, and seemingly the availability of one-half acre lots was not
a foundation of the decision.
22. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
23. Id at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519 (quoting Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 390 (1926».
24. 12 lli. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957).
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of exclusionary zoning in Senior v. Zoning Commission. 25 The court
held the fact that New Canaan was the wealthiest per capita commu
nity in the nation to be a proper consideration "in deciding whether
the establishment of a superior residential district would be the most
appropriate use of [the] unspoiled area."26 Directly addressing the
exclusionary concept, the court recited that in addition to zoning for
the wealthy there were some 625 four-acre sites, 1,879 two-acre sites,
753 one-acre sites and eighty-seven half-acre sites as well as some
1,100 sites requiring less than one-half acre to erect a single-family
dwelling. 27
Virginia entered the field in 1959 with a purely egalitarian deci
sion when its Supreme Court in Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper 28 invalidated Fairfax County's two-acre zoning plan. In a
county where ninety percent of the people lived in the eastern one
third and the population had doubled in the past seven years, two
acre zoning in the western two-thirds of the county was held unlaw
ful on the grounds that it forced low-income people to live in the
eastern area. The court stated:
The practical effect of the amendment is to prevent people in the
low income bracket from living in the western area and forcing
them into the eastern area, thereby reserving the western area for
those who could afford to build houses on two acres or more. This
would serve private rather than public interests. Such an inten
tional and exclusionary purpose would bear no relation to the
health, safety, morals, prosperity and general welfare. 29

This case appears to represent a rejection of the regional planning
called for by New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York.
In 1965 Pennsylvania initiated a landslide of exclusionary zon
ing cases with National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Town
Ship.30 A township, determined by the state supreme court to stand
in the path of progress, had zoned thirty percent of the township for
one unit of housing per four acres, seventeen percent for one unit per
two acres and some thirty-five percent for one unit per acre. The
court ruled that the four-acre zoning was exclusionary at the behest
of a developer seeking the right to utilize his land in the four-acre
zone for the erection of one house on one acre. There was no gen
25. 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960).
26. Id at 535, 153 A.2d at 418.
27. Id
28. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
29. Id at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
30. 419 Pa. 504,215 A.2d 597.
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eral development scheme proposed to the court. The court appar
ently regarded the thirty-five percent of the township zoned for one
house per acre to be an inadequate provision for smaller lot zoning .
though not yet developed without holding that four acres was unlaw
ful per se. The court addressed the general issues of expanding pop
ulation, a natural place for development, and the need for housing
opportunity in the suburbs. No plaintiff seeking better housing from
outside or inside the township, poor or otherwise, was involved.
Nevertheless, the court characterized the zoning as exclusionary, in
effect protecting private property rights based in part at least on so
cial considerations unrelated to those property rights.
The basis of the finding of unconstitutionality appears to be a
combination of exceeding the police power and interference with
private property rights. Though noting the greater value of land
zoned for more density, the court did not find a taking.
Exclusionary zoning charges were met directly in a 1967 Mary
land case, County Commissioners v. Miles, 31 wherein it was alleged
that five-acre zoning to protect the wealthy was beyond the police
power because there was no public purpose. Though agreeing that a
public purpose was necessary the court found such a purpose in the
"distinctive nature of the water-front county and the many historic
sites" and because the "ordinance makes fair and reasonable provi- .
sion for all the different kinds of housing required in the County."32
Whether the different kinds of housing language of the decision her
alds a recognition of the Pennsylvania role on types of housing is not
clear. Though the word "required" needs definition, the holding
would sustain a plausible argument that any reasonable type of
housing must be permitted by zoning in Maryland.
The judiciary in California recognized the exclusionary zoning
doctrine at least as early as 1971 in the case of Confederacion de la
Raza Unida v. City ofMorgan Hill.33· An action was brought to place
government-sponsored low·income housing ma specific sector of the
city on the grounds that the inability to do so under the zoning code
constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendment and the
supremacy clause of the National Housing Act. 34 The claim was re
jected on the grounds that there were other sectors of the city zoned
so as to permit the density proposed.
31. 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967).
32. Id at 371, 228 A.2d at 458.
33. 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
34. Act of Sept. I, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888.
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Michigan also invalidated exclusion in 1971 in Bristow v. City of
Woodhaven .35 In Bristow the focus was on the class of people who
might live in the mobile homes that were being excluded:
Such zoning may never stand where its primary purpose is . . .
the exclusion of a certain element of residential dwellers. [I]t be
comes incumbent upon the municipality to establish or substanti
ate the existence of a relationship between the exclusion of this
legitimate use and public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. 36

It is not clear whether other housing styles far less commonly dis

criminated against, such as townhouses, twins, and others would be
given similar treatment. If the purpose, or perhaps the result, were
to exclude a certain element of residential dwellers it would be logi
cal to include townhouses and other types of multiunit housing.
However, because mobile homes are the type of housing avail
able to the lowest economic level of home-buying American citizens
it would not be surprising to see develop a special deference to such
housing under one theory or another.
In 1972 in Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton 37
a federal court in New Hampshire in dictum acknowledged that it
could be beyond the police power to zone with exclusionary intent
but ruled out the existence of an exclusionary zoning issue where a
developer challenged a change in zoning from 35,000 square feet to
three and six-acre lots. 38 The specific charges were: no substantial
relation to health, safety and welfare, taking under the fifth amend
ment, and discrimination under the fourteenth amendment. No
poor parties were involved. The court sustained the zoning change
on the grounds that the municipality was very sparsely settled, the
land proposed to be used had special scenic and open space value,
the development primarily was for second homes and the proposed
development would drastically alter not only the landscape but the
population balance in the municipality. Irrespective of the court's
recognition of the issue,. the ingredients of exclusionary zoning were
present.

35. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). Exclusion of mobile homes is
sometimes precluded solely because it is a rejection of a legitimate business use.
36. Id. at 217-18, 192 N.W.2d at 328.
.
37. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 958-59.
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Mount Laurel

Then, in 1975 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
ofMount Laure/39 was decided. As improbable as it might seem, a
decision from a state very late, if not last, to the table has seemingly
become synonymous nationwide with the concept of exclusionary
zoning. The action was initiated by a developer, the NAACP, and
several named individual poor, black and white plaintiffs from in
side and outside the township of Mount Laurel. It sought a change
in zoning because no provision had been made for multiunit hous
ing. The township had almost quadrupled in population between
1950 and 1970. In 1964, it had enacted an ordinance permitting only
single-family residential units primarily on acreage of one-half acre
per unit. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that in a developing
township the regulations were incompatible with the New Jersey
Constitution because they failed to promote the general welfare.
The developing township concept required: (1) Sizable land
area; (2) lyiilg outside the central cities and older built-up suburbs;
(3) that the township must have substantially shed its rural charac
teristics; (4) must either have undergone great population increases
since Wodd War II or must now be in the process of doing so;
(5) must not be completely developed; and (6) must be in the path of
inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and
growth. 40
Not only has Mount Laurel followed rather than initiated, it has
probably not contributed any totally new conceptual element to the
substantive doctrine, not even the concept of the developing town
ship. In substantially less doctrinaire form, the concept that exclu
sion could take place only where there was a demand for a certain
use, that is, where the municipality was developing, had been at least
an inherent factor in every decision rendered. For example, in Na
tional Land the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had spoken of the
town being in "the path of a population expansion ..."41 and in In
re Girsh ,42 the court assumed a demand for apartments because a
developer desired to build them.43 It plausibly could be argued that
to the extent Mount Laurel exempts nondeveloping townships even
though there is a demand to build there, a new element has been
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Id at 160,336 A.2d at 717.
419 Pa. at 519, 215 A.2d at 605.
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
Id at 245, 263 A.2d at 399.
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added. But it would appear that Mount Laurel did introduce a new
remedial concept in relation to the doctrine, that is, judicial supervi
sion of the rezoning of a township in favor of regional interests, in
cluding those of the poor. This is probably the salient feature of the
decision.
Perhaps the ultimate appraisal of the impact of Mount Laurel is
that it would appear that no state has adopted an exclusionary zon
ing doctrine citing Mount Laurel as authority. Mount Laurel was
cited in a dissent44 in Minnesota, a state that does not appear to have
adopted exclusionary zoning. The majority had sustained a morato
rium imposing a ten-acre minimum in an area formerly zoned for
one-unit for two and one-half acres.
C. Subsequent Decisions
The status of the law after Mount Laurel is what it was before.
Those decisions listed hereinabove and the basic expressions therein
represent a rather complete picture of the state of exclusionary zon
ing decisions before and after Mount Laurel.
Even to the extent that Mount Laurel has been cited, it does not
appear that the basic rationale adopted has related any more to
Mount Laurel than to the decisional process in other jurisdictions.
Typical treatment given Mount Laurel is found in the significant
New York decision, Berenson v. Town of New Castle. 45 Mount Lau
rel was relegated to a terse reference along with decisions from other
states with at least a suggestion that it was only of academic interest
because New York had long had its own exclusionary zoning
decisions. 46
Perhaps most important is assessing the impact and desirability
of the doctrine itself rather than Mount Laurel per se. In doing that
the single most important factor may be not whether the doctrine has
been specifically followed but the fact that, as noted, the doctrine
itself has never been rejected. The courts have uniformly assumed
the power to review charges of zoning exclusion. Any assessment of
recognition would have to be based on a report of one hundred per
cent success for the theory as opposed to success for the litigants.
Though both Pennsylvania and New Jersey are relative
latecomers, within the past seven years the vast majority of exclu
44. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 85·86, 245 N.W.2d 819, 836
(1976) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
45. ·38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672.
46. Id at 108-09, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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sionary zoning decisions have come from the two states. 47 The only
other state having even a handful of cases is New York.48 For this
reason, an assessment of the impact of the doctrine means, primarily,
closely scrutinizing the law in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
The clearly definable doctrinal differences between the New
Jersey and Pennsylvania approach are twofold. First, in Penn
sylvania, housing types, such as townhouses, atrium, and twins,
among others, must be provided for.49 No such status for types of
housing has been recognized in the state of New Jersey. In Penn
sylvania even though there may be adequate provision for multiunit
housing to meet the expected increase in population in the foresee
able future, the township has still zoned in an impermissibly exclu
sionary manner if it fails to provide for every reasonable type of
housing that ~ght logically be built in the township. 50
The second obvious distinction, as noted, is remedial. It is the
willingness of the New Jersey judiciary to supervise revision of an
entire zoning ordinance in favor of the general welfare rather than
grant only site specific relief to a plaintiff developer. 51
But if the decisions are viewed collectively, without reliance on
enunciated doctrine alone, other significant differences appear. New
Jersey decisions often directly involve the poor as plaintiffs or as pro
jected occupants. 52 They are definitely egalitarian. Pennsylvania's
litigation has primarily involved developers seeking to make money
by securing the rezoning ofland to a greater density. 53 Though de
47. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, §§ 8.01-8.14.
48. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
49. 437 Pa. at 237, 263 A.2d at 395 (apartments); Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 519,319 A.2d 197 (1974) (townhouses).
50. 437 Pa. at 237, 263 A.2d at 395.
51. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977).
52. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount. Laurel,
67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
53. See, e.g., In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land and Inv.
Co. v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
The poor have clearly been involved in two actions in Pennsylvania. The first was
an action by the Commonwealth, twelve individuals of low and middle-income (black
and white) and two corporations allegedly desiring to build low and moderate income
housing in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Bucks County, 8 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin all Bucks County mu
nicipalities from "allegedly discriminatory exercise of the zoning function and requiring
them either to legislate in the zoning field or to require special exceptions by local zoning
hearing boards so that low and moderate income housing would be permitted" 302 A.2d
at 899. Plaintiff sought similar relief against the County Planning Commission and
Housing Authority. Id On appeal the case was summarily disposed of by the Common
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velopers and the courts give lip service to the poor, the real poor
have rarely, and never successfully, been the plaintiffs and housing
has not been seriously proposed for them by the developers except
perhaps in the case of mobile homes. As stated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board,54 the zoning
concept is not an egalitarian one but rather a type of substantive due
process analysis. 55 In the New Jersey decision, Glenview Develop
ment Co. v. Franklin Township, 56 three- and five-acre zoning was sus
tained as valid against a challenge as exclusionary in part on the
grounds that what the developer had proposed would not serve the
interest of the poor. 57 No Pennsylvania decision has ever cited lack
of aid to the poor as an exclusionary zoning challenge.
In New Jersey, the developing township doctrine and the six
considerations set forth in Mount Laurel to determine whether the
township is developing have become a somewhat rigid formula to be
seriously applied. New Jersey courts have now repeatedly held on
varying evidence that a given township is not developing and there
fore need not zone for multiunit housing. 58 Pennsylvania talks of a
logical place for developing but gives only cursory attention at best
to relevant demographic factors and though giving some lip service
to demand has not given any realistic recognition to the developing
township concept. 59 Adequate housing in adjacent townships can
wealth Court primarily on the grounds that no building permits had been applied for to
build and that in any event the relief requested would intrude into the legislative field
and inject the court into political and non-justiciable controversy. 302 A.2d at 900,904
05.
The second and more traditional exclusionary action involving the poor was Raum
v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 426, 342 A.2d 450 (1975), in which certain
low-income individuals in a township intervened in an action contesting the validity of
an ordinance creating a unified development area on the grounds that it was exclusionary
because of alleged failure to provide for low-income housing. The court ruled against
the challenge because the proposed development had provided for houses for as little as
$18,000, no one had applied to build low-income housing in any event and for that mat
ter the decline of low-income individuals in the township was attributable to market
forces rather than zoning. Id at 444,342 A.2d at 459.
54. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
55. Id at 188, 382 A.2d at 108.
56. 164 N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384 (1978).
57. See Rose, Three-and Five-Acre Zoning Upheld in New Jersey-Rural Town Ex
empt From Mt. Laurel Requirement, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 57 (1979). Rose was a witness in
!be case, and judging from the results, a highly competent one.
58. See, e.g., Glenview Dev. Co., 164 N.J. Super. at 563, 397 A.2d at 384; Windmill
Estates, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 158 N.J. Super. 179,385 A.2d 924 (App. Div.
1978).
59. A comparison of two townships both of which were found to be in the path of
progress by the Pennsylvania courts is illustrative. In Girsh, Nether Providence Town
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form an acceptable defense in New Jersey,60 and New York as
well,61 and high-rise apartment buildings may be excluded on the
same grounds.62 The former was not true at least until the 1978
amendments to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code au
thorizing municipalities to do joint planning. 63 The latter has never
been true.
As noted, the approach to remedy has differed. In New Jersey
there has been a strong proclivity for the courts to hold out for a
general revision to correct zoning deficiencies on the comprehensive
level without primary regard to site-specific relief. For instance, liti
gation started in 1970 in the New Jersey case, Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison,64 came before the state supreme court
in 1977. The court finally granted site-specific relief to the corporaship, based on the 1960 census, was 12 miles from Philadelphia with approximately 2,802
persons per square mile. 437 Pa. at 238, 263 A.2d at 386. According to table I of the
U.S. census of 1970, lying next to it on the way to Philadelphia was Marple Township
with a population density of 2,401 persons per square mile. Buckingham Township, ac
cording to the U.S. census of 1970, had a population density of 156 persons per square
mile, approximately 5.6% of the population density of Nether Providence Township at
the time Girslt was decided. Between it and Philadelphia lay Wrightstown and Warwick
townships with population densities of 223 and 193 per square mile respectively.
Buckingham Township had for some years had property zoned at a density of four
units per acre, none of which had been developed at that density. The courts approved
approximately 9,000 dwelling units in a township with a 1970 population of 5,150 indi
viduals housed in 1,609 dwelling units according to the 1970 U.S. Census. This type of
overkill makes it clear that the court's purpose was not, solely at least, to correct a defi
ciency. The author was involved in this litigation as counsel at the appellate level.
60. Nigito v. Borough of Closter, 142 N.J. Super. 1,359 A.2d 521 (App. Div. 1976);
Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 102, 341 N.E.2d at 236, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 672. It was stated in

Berenson:
[In this regard we there noted that] [s]o long as the regional and local needs for
such housing were supplied by either the local community or by other accessi
ble areas in the community at large, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
such ar. ordinance had no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.
Iii. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.y.s.2d at 681-82.
61. See, e.g., Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 102,341 N.E.2d at 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
62. See, e.g., Swiss Village Assoc. v. Municipal Council, 162 N.J. Super. 138, 392
A.2d 596 (Ch. Div. 1978).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11101 (Purdon 1972). Though the Article authorizes
joint municipal Planning Commissions, joint zoning is not provided for and it is not clear
what the effect would be if member municipalities chose to enact zoning pursuant to joint
planning in such a way as to exclude the poor from certain of the planning townships.
Iii. § 11102. But, to paraphrase the principle rather than the literal language, the Penn
sylvania court has indicated that regional planning would be desirable, it being clear that
the region must zone for everything for all people. National Land, 419 Pa. at 511, 215
A.2d at 603.
64. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
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tion that sought to build low-income housing. 65 By contrast, in
Pennsylvania it was early adopted that as a matter of reward, the
developer should be able to pursue his plans irrespective of the desir
ability of comprehensive planning in the township.66 Until 1977,
when Surrick was announced, the Pennsylvania courts had not for
mally adopted the amorphous fair-share concept that has caused the
New Jersey judiciary so much difficulty.67
Most significantly, as noted,68 Pennsylvania does not grant relief
beyond site-specific performance. A township's zoning may remain
exclusionary after a developer has won and built the housing pro
posed by him. The Pennsylvania courts have yet to force and super
vise a general revision of a township ordinance. There is force only
in the sense that the township's ordinance has been declared uncon
stitutional. Hoping to avoid further problems with developers,
townships customarily revise their ordinances after they are at
tacked. Quite frequently they were in the process of revising when
the curative challenges were filed because the challengers did not
like the proposed changes. 69
Though stating the traditional deference doctrine to the effect
that legislation is to be considered presumptively constitutional, both
New Jersey and Pennsylvania have in fact actually inverted the pre
65. Id at 552-54,371 A.2d at 1127-28.
66. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 228, 328 ~.2d 464, 468 (1974).
67. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion in Surrick, 476 Pa. at 182,382 A.2d
at 105, strongly objected to the majority's explicit adoption of the fair-share concept from
the New Jersey judiciary on the grounds that it had caused undue concern and trouble to
the New Jersey courts, stating: "Our own case law has proved adequate to the task of
preventing unconstutitional exclusionary zoning schemes without involving our judiciary
in the endless complications engendered by MI. Laurel in New Jersey. We would do well
to continue to steer clear of ·fair-share· ... Id at 200-01. 382 A.2d at 115 (Roberts. J .•
concurring) (footnote omitted). He charged the majority with going "far beyond any
thing this Court had ever decided or suggested" in introducing "fair-share." Id The
majority disagreed. and the author believes rightly so. stating that the fair-share doctrine
had always been part of the Pennsylvania approach. Id at 191 n.8. 382 A.2d at 109 n.8.
It has been part of the substantive analysis.
Inasmuch as Justice Roberts equated the detailed supervisory role of the New Jersey
courts with the fair-share concept. and the majority did not appear to. the difference
between the two is perhaps illusory. If, in adopting or reaffirming the fair-share principle
in Surrick the Pennsylvania court intended to adopt responsibility for supervising revi
sion of zoning ordinances in relation to regional interest. it has not become apparent
there or in any other decision. The court's role still appears to be one of telling Penn
sylvania municipalities to get out of shark infested waters.
68. See, e.g.• National Land. 419 Pa. at 504. 215 A.2d at 597.
69. See, e.g.. In re F.P.A. Corp.• 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 221. 360 A.2d 851 (1976);
Buckingham Township v. Yaroschuk. 4 Pa. D.& C.3d 790 (1977). q/f'd sub nom., Buck
ingham Township v. Barness. 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 364. 382 A.2d 140 (1978). uri. de.•ied.
439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
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sumption of constitutionality of legislative action.70 Pennsylvania
especially has abdicated any serious effort to exercise judicial re
straint. In Pennsylvania something akin to the compelling state in
terest approach has been taken wherein the courts declare that once
it has been established that there is in fact exclusionary zoning the
burden devolves on the municipality to establish compelling reasons
for it. 71 In general, Pennsylvania has taken an extremely limited
view of the power of the local legislatures to create large lot zoning,
even to the point of invalidating it as unreasonable where admittedly
not exclusionary.72
The New York decisions tend to coincide with the New Jersey
approach. Exclusionary zoning litigation is heavy and quite often
successful only in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
70.

One commentator has observed:
There is clearly a distinction to be drawn between the test suggested in
Livermore, which merely calls for application of some statewide concept of
public welfare in evaluating a zoning ordinance, and the Pennsylvania ap
proach which, as a matter of constitutional law, defines the substantive concep
tion of public welfare to be applied. While the Livermore reasoning was.
prompted by the inability of local city councils to balance the competing inter
ests, the Pennsylvania court has indicated no basis-other than judicial flat
for its decision that property owners cannot fend for themselves in the political
arena. No strong argument supports the Nalional Land proposition that a court
may choose to give greater protection to the right of a property owner to de
velop his land than to the right of a locality to plan for orderly development
within its boundaries.
Note, supra note 7, at 1163.
The author also suggested that the Pennsylvania approach was simply an exercise in
the preferences of the Pennsylvania judiciary and concluded that the California courts
had rejected such "antiquated notions." Id
71. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. at 194-95,382 A.2d at Ill.
72. In a recent case, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that though
there was no exclusion in the township that ten acre zoning exceeded the police power.
Martin v. Township of Millcreek, 50 Pa. Commw. Ct. 249, 413 A.2d 764 (1980). The
court said that the zoning plan was not reasonable and was therefore arbitrary and capri
cious and would not, in any event, save farmland. Id at 258, 413 A.2d at 768. The court
came close to holding that there was a taking but perhaps it was only one relevant factor
in relation to the reasonableness of the zoning.
Planner, consultant and primary architect of the Philadelphia Urban Renewal Ren
aissance, Edward Bacon, has suggested just the contrary; that 10 acre minimums would
be highly desirable from the perspective of maintaining the quality of nature and open
space:
Because so many people are seeking a place in the natural countryside around
cities, land cannot be wasted. Land should be subdivided either in lots large
enough to preserve the essential characteristics of nature (ten acres for example)
or lots large enough to meet the immediate space needs a family. This, in tum,
leads to an entire new zoning idea: specification of a maximum size of a resi
dential lot in certain areas.
URBAN LAND, April 1, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
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A more positive assessment of the spread ofjudicially mandated
regional and nonexclusionary planning for housing needs was found
by one commentator who stated without recitation of the states
involved:
One finds that many state courts have adopted an assessment of
regional housing needs as an intrinsic element in their review of
zoning ordinances; a perusal of case law indicates that this has
. become an element in the court decisions of at least eight states,
including five of the eight largest states in the United States, con
taining between them roughly one-third of the nation's
population. 73

It is believed that the court's assessment in the manifestly anti
exclusionary zoning decision of Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of
Brookhaven 74 is somewhat more accurate in addressing the trend:
In this republic, invidious legal classifications ultimately

yield, even at some pain to the established social order. . . but if
past is prologue no prescience is necessary to forecast that the pro
cess of eliminating the invidiously exclusionary aspects of Euclid
ian zoning will be a protracted one. At the Federal level the
'intentional discrimination' standard enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropoli
tan Housing Development Corp. . . . eliminates anypragmatic fed
eral judicial remedy at this time and the few states to .consider the
exclusion issue have been slow to move. 75

Litigation successes are, of course, reflected in the reporters.
Actual construction successes are often another matter. For in
stance, after successful litigation in Girsh, not one of the 1,600 pro
posed units was built. And, after winning in National Land very
little construction took place. But, there are building success stories
for the developers. Some feeling for construction success and failure
might be gained by a perusal of the response to a March 4, 1982
questionnaire by the author inquiring, among other things, as to the
number of units actually built pursuant to curative challenges. 76
73. Mallach, Exclusionary Zoning Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 9 REAL
LJ. 275, 289 (1981).
74. 91 Misc. 2d 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1977), mod(fted, 63 A.D.2d 731, 405,
N.Y.S.2d 302 (1978).
75. Id at 84-85, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
76. Inquiry was made with respect to many significant decisions arising on the east
coast, where the bulk of litigation has occurred. It is not suggested that the inquiry is
statistically valid. The survey asked first the number of housing units that had been
proposed and second, the number that had been actually completed as of the time of the
EST.
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REASONS FOR NOT FOLLOWING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
DECISIONS

Almost all of the reasons cited hereinafter as to why there has
not been, or should not be, a greater judicial following of the exclu
sionary zoning decisions overlap and interrelate. The limited docu
mentation is intended primarily to be representative of the type of
data available rather than totally supportive in either quantity or
quality to substantiate any thesis. Patently, a vast amount of re
search would need to be done in order to make the proper legislative
determinations. Such research would encompass the fields of sociol
ogy, criminology, housing market analysis, planning, political sci
ence, all five, or more.
A.

What's Wrong With Exclusionary Zoning?

Though it might be somewhat extreme to suggest that reason
able minds could not differ concerning exclusionary zoning, the
problem, if there is one, has been overstated almost to the point of
hysteria by a number of prominent writers. One author states:
Yet perhaps the most troubling aspect of Belle Terre is the Court's
abdication of its constitutional responsibility. Again there is the
suggestion that zoning is a purely legislative function, with no
proper supervisory role for the federal courts. This is a most lam
entable situation.
In narrowing the issue to a specific project, the Court precluded
even the most superficial attack on the loathesome [sic] effects of
survey. Some additional information is reported, including data concerning lawsuits not
inquired about. Copies of the responses have been furnished to the Western New Eng
land Low Review. The results were as follows: In re Girsh, 437 Pa. at 237, 263 A.2d at
395 (1700 proposed, 0 constructed); Coslett v. Township of Marple, 62 Del. 552 (1975)
(104 proposed, 35 constructed with construction proceeding); In re Concord Township,
439 Pa. at 446, 268 A.2d at 765 (117 proposed, 110 constructed); National Land, 419 Pa.
at 466, 268 A.2d at 765 (0 constructed, handful built under a negotiated two-acre stan
dard); Oakwood at Madison, 72 N.J. at 481, 371 A.2d at 765 (1750 proposed, 0 con
structed; construction anticipated-held up by subsequent litigation with respect to
punitive water connection fees); Warwick Land Development Corp. v. Board of Supervi
sors, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 450, 376 A.2d 679 (1977) (176 proposed, 100 constructed, still
under construction).
In response to an inquiry about Mount Laurel, counsel for the Township of Mount
Laurel, John W. Tremble, Esq., replied as follows: "This was a hypothetical lawsuit.
The P's [plaintiffs] never had a proposal for building housing. Their attorneys were only
attempting to win an exclusionary zoning case-not find housing for low and moderate
income people." Letter from John W. Tremble to Olan B. Lowrey, (March 4, 1982)
(written on the standard inquiry form used in the survey).
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exclusionary zoning. 77

Another comments that "[T]he Court's willingness to evaluate land
use policies under the due process clause seems restricted to actual
fits of municipal madness; mean and self-serving acts of exclusion
are apparently to be received as jeweled exercises of the police
power."78 Yet another warns that:
Justifications based upon the preservation of the community char
acter, fiscal integrity, or other purely provincial concerns, how
ever, cannot be given much weight when their effect will be to
limit the potential choice of living conditions for millions of
people.
If the people in this country are to be afforded the widest pos

sible choice in regard to where they may live, most or all of the
recommended actions must be implemented. To minimize the
ever increasing housing and employment opportunity crisis facing
millions of people in this country these actions must be imple
mented in the immediate future. Failure to undertake the recom
mended actions cannot help but exacerbate a problem that is
already at a crisis level. The consequences of such a failure can
not help but be dire. To permit some philosophical view of feder
alism to produce such dire consequences is madness. 79

It may well be that the issue of exclusionary zoning is more
moral than either legal or practical, that the vast literature relating to
it is concerned with people's concept of right and wrong more than
the significance of any established and traditional law involved in
the various jurisdictions that have acted in relation to it. It has been
expressed well:
Finally, a major underlying proposition in support of the fight
against exclusionary zoning, has been that to the degree that subur
ban growth takesplace, and will continue to do so, people ofall races
and incomes should share in that growth. The essence of the prop
osition is choice. People who want to live in the cities should be
able to continue to do so, but no one should be compelled to live
in the cities (or anywhere) by virtue of their economic level or
77. Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Activist-Re
straint Debate, 40 U. PIrr. L. REV. 169, 196,215 (1978-79).
78. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated' Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1421 (1978).
79. McDougal, Contemporary Authoritative Conceptions of Federalism and Exclu
sionary Land Use Planning: A Critique, 21 B.C.L. REV. 301, 308, 344 (1979-80).
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Indeed, very little attention has been given to the actual need
for housing in certain localities, the desire for such housing, the need
to live there or the capacity to pay for it. The courts generally have
not directed themselves to the question of whether or not anyone is
actually being precluded by zoning from moving into a general re
gion as opposed to being precluded from moving into a specific gov
ernmental area. In an article strongly supporting judicial activism in
exclusionary zoning decisions, the planner Alan Mallach candidly
stated:
No serious critic of the practices of exclusionary suburbs has ever
seriously argued that all suburbs exclude all but the wealthy; al
though many indeed do, one finds suburban communities in many
metropolitan areas in which housing is available for middle-in
come families. In the New York SMSA, for example, the Town of
Brookhaven in Suffolk County saw, during the 1970s, the con
struction of some 30,000 houses, largely selling for prices between
$35,000 and $45,000, many affordable by families earning roughly
the median income in the region. Similar communities are found
in many parts of the country. Other suburban communities,
where new construction may be either expensive or limited in
number, still offer existing houses at prices affordable by middle
income families; in the Philadelphia SMSA, for example, there are
a handful of communities of clearly suburban character in which
the median resale price of single-family houses was under $40,000
in 1979.81

Even without definitive statistics to illuminate the situation it is
abundantly clear that there are not a sufficient number of wealthy
individuals to take up all the land surrounding metropolitan areas
no matter what zoning standard is used. Natural market forces
alone will ensure that where there is a dollar to purchase there will
be a place to spend it outside the city for housing or any other
product.
What is not certain is that any person can buy a home in any
municipality that he chooses because the municipality may be too
expensive. It may be too expensive because it was pioneered with
large lot zoning or by affluent people that have established an ambi
ance that has engendered a high market price or because of an espe
cially desirable location. This is where the true crux of the conflict
80. Mallach, supra note 58, at 282 (emphasis in original).
81. Id at 280-81 (citations omitted).
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between the judicial housing activist and others appears to be: the
concept that every township must have its poor town or be a micro
cosm of American society in general. One of the most effective de
lineations of the issue was made by Justice Schreiber of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in his dissent in Oakwood:
There is broad language in Mt. Laurel to the effect that a "de
veloping" municipality must provide by its land use regulations
the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice
of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live
within its boundaries. . .. I do not accept that generalization.
The general welfare calls for adequate housing of all types, but
not necessarily within any particular municipality. . . . Environ
mental, ecological, geological, geographical, demographic, re
gional or other factors may justify exclusion of certain types of
housing, be it two-acre or multifamily.82
There have always been sectors, sometimes relatively large ones,
where not everyone could afford to live and therefore could not live.
What is so pernicious about such a sector where it happens to coin
cide with the municipal boundaries of a governmental entity? Is the
moral outrage primarily focused on the fact that local governmental
action has contributed to the inability of some people to afford to
live in some areas? If so, the anger would appear to be misdirected.
There is every probability that what has been characterized as im
permissible exclusionary zoning actually gives rise to greater diver
sity and therefore greater general pleasure in society. The principle
has been well-expressed by Robert C. Ellickson:
One can find much to admire in the Mount Laurel decision. The
court properly perceived that state judiciaries must playa role in
curbing local parochialism and had the wisdom to rest its decision
on the right document-the state constitution. But it clearly bun
gled the remedy. A suburb should not be prohibited from impos
ing elite standards for housing construction if it is willing to
compensate those injured by the standards. There is little to rec
ommend policies designed to ensure that each neighborhood has a
mixture of all housing types (and hence all income groups). The
famous Tiebout Hypothesis suggests that differentation among
suburbs enhances consumer satisfaction by making available a
wider variety of packages of public goods. The Mount Laurel de
cision needlessly reduces the richness of residential choices avail
82.

72 N.J. at 622, 371 A.2d at 1263 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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able to New Jersey households. 83

Have we reached the point where we insist that "birds of a feather
not flock together" at least exclusively in a given municipality? If so,
are we overlooking the fact that even if every municipality plans for
a poor section there would still not be social integration? What merit
is there in any event to attempted mandated social and economic
integration? Whatever merit there may be has been emphatically re~
jected by the American public, who almost uniformly buy into the
most exclusive community they can afford.
Townhouses and apartments will not, by exclusionary zoning
decisions at least, be interspersed among the homes of the affluent in
any event. Is that degree of forced social integration next on the
agenda of the activist? It has very nearly been suggested by Anthony
Downes in his book, Opening Up The Suburbs. 84 He first urges that
low income housing be placed everywhere so that the American pub
lic will not flee where it has been placed because there is no place to
flee. 85 He then suggests as a further possible remedy: "In all cases,
some residential mixing of deprived households with non-deprived
households, with the latter exerting a dominant influence, is necessary
to achieve a sign!ftcant upgrading of the former. "86

B. Zoning as a Democratic Process
Zoning for exclusive sectors simply aids the process of voting
for preferences with dollars. It is fundamentally nothing more than
an exercise in democracy so that the greatest majority can achieve
the greatest happiness. Zoning is a democratic process that has per
mitted what people want so long as it bears some substantial rela
tionship to health, safety or general welfare. As stated by Justice
Douglas in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: 87 ''The police power is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places."88
For instance, a height limitation of thirty feet on one side of the
street and 100 feet on the other is nothing more than a legitimate
exercise in preference.
If a certain area is desirable because of the character of the
classes that live there will it not become less desirable to the extent
83. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
L.l. 385, 506 (1977).
84. A. DOWNS, OPENING Up THE SUBURBS (1973).
85. Id at 141.
86. Id at 31.
87. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
88. Id at 3-4.
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that classes with differing perspectives are introduced? And, if it is a
matter of open space, won't that quality be severely diminished by
the very act of erecting the higher density housing essential to the
poor? Is the open space to be that adjacent to where the lower in
come housing is erected? If so, the owners of that open space will
have been crowded because their new neighbors have intensified the
use of the land that formerly was a visual and auditory amenity.
Explicitly, imagine several four-acre plots of ground. Each neighbor
enjoys the space of every other neighbor. Place multiunit housing on
one and you diminish the quality of life for all. If this is to be
avoided by placing all multiunit housing next to other multiunit
housing then the poor have moved from a crowded city to a crowded
suburb.
Or, do we put the poor where no one lives so that they are sur
rounded by forest or farmland, both obviously lacking in transport,
jobs and social services for the poor? Perhaps we should put no one
anywhere.
C. Economic Factors, Not ExclUSionary Zoning, Exclude Poor
From Suburbs
There is a common perception that exclusionary zoning ex
cludes the poor from the suburbs. 89 This is not true. Cost of housing
in the suburbs, along with other factors, excludes the poor. If zoning
were rescinded or if every acre in the suburbs surrounding each ma
jor American city were zoned for unlimited multiunit housing, the
poor could not afford to buy the housing constructed and there is
nothing to indicate that any more housing would be built. Housing
is built only for a market and that means purchasers with resources
to buy.
In Mount Laurel it was recognized that the poor could not af
ford to purchase housing erected for them, that it would have to be
built by a public sector or private charity.9o In the Pennsylvania de
89. McDougal, supra note 79, at 305.
90. Specifically, the court in Mount Laurel said:
The record is replete with uncontradicted evidence that, factually, low and
moderate income housing cannot be built without some form of contribution,
concession or incentive by some level of government. Such, under various state
and federal methods, may take the form of public construction or some sort of
governmental assistance or encouragement to private building. Multi-family
rental units, at a high density, or, at most, low-cost single-family units on very
small lots, are economically necessary and in tum require appropriate local
land use regulations.
67 N.J. at 170 n.8, 336 A.2d at 722 n.8.
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cision of Raum v. Board of Supervisors ,91 the court concluded that
the inability of the poor to live in the suburbs was a result of market
function and not discrimination. 92 Even some writers are beginning
to recognize the fact of market exclusion as opposed to zoning exclu
sion. Frederick M. Wirt obse.rved that "metropolitan color sorting
rests partly upon economic grounds; higher property values con
fronting a black group characteristically possessing more limited re
sources than whites, would serve to keep the former out of suburbia
even if whites were free of all racial prejudice."93 The effect of uni
formly zoning for those of lesser income without massive govern
mental or private funding of low-income housing construction
would be the destruction of some homogeneity in some few munici
palities only, as well as, perhaps, some intensification of social
problems.
It probably would not even seriously affect the white flight phe
91. 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 426, 342 A.2d 450 (1975).
92. The Raum court recognized that market conditions, not zoning, excluded the

poor:
The crux of Main Line's challenge is that the Township's zoning is exclu
sionary in that it fails to provide for its "fair share" of housing opportunities for
low and moderate income persons. . . . Assuming that we hold the Town
ship's zoning to be exclusionary, Main Line argues that the "fair share" concept
be implemented by requiring Fox to affirmatively allocate and develop a por
tion of Chesterbrook as low and moderate income housing units, or that the
Township be ordered to plan and zone for such housing.
We do not decide the question of the appropriate remedy here, however, as
we cannot agree that the Township is exclusionary when considered in light of
the rezoning achieved. . . . At best, the record establishes that over the past
decade the percentage of low income (and minority) residents of the Township
has declined, while the development proceeding in the Township has been ip
the nature of single-family dwellings and apartments affordable by persons of
above average income. The evidence, however, does not establish that this di
rection in suburban growth is attributable to the zoning of the Township.
Rather, it would appear to be attributable to the high cost of land and accessory
services common to municipalities within access of the Philadelphia metropoli
tan area. This basic fact of life does not render the zoning of the Township
exclusionary. . .. Given the high density, multiple-family uses permitted
under Ordinance No. 267, which at the time the Chesterbrook development was
approved provided for housing units for as low as $18,000.00, we can only con
clude that Main Line has failed to sustain its burden of proving the Township's
zoning to be exclusionary.
Id at 443-45, 342 A.2d at 458-59 (citation omitted).
This is believed to be the closest decision in Pennsylvania to holding that the poor as
such have rights under exclusionary zoning doctrine. But, the issue was not squarely
met.
93. Wirt, Financial and Desegregation Reform in Suburbia, in 7 THE URBANIZA
TION OF THE SUBURBS (L. Masotti and J. Hadden eds. 1973).
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nomenon because there is now no shortage of housing in the suburbs
for those who can afford to pay.
If the focus were on those of some steady but limited income
beyond that of the poor it is possible, even probable, that mobile
homes would find their way into municipalities where they have not
heretofore been welcome. But, there is no reason to believe that the
total number of mobile or other homes available to those with lim
ited income would increase beyond the personal capacity to buy
those homes. There is no reason to believe that market price would
be significantly affected by rezoning of some or all municipalities.
No one would be naive enough to assume that new housing of
whatever kind will be built for the American poor by the private
sector. And, the statistics make it clear that such building will not be
done by the public sector either at least until such time as the con
cept of quality for government-sponsored housing is changed drasti
cally. As pointed out in the 1971 presidential address to the
American public on the state of housing, at a time when some 40% of
American citizens were qualified for government-sponsored housing,
the cost would be astronomical if all eligible families were subsidized
and there would be a substantial social inequity if the Federal gov
ernment enabled some people to occupy better housing than many of
those who worked to pay the taxes to enable the construction of that
housing. 94
94. In the Third Annual Report on National Housing Goals, the President of the
United States stated in part:
A second major policy issue posed by the current array of Federal housing
programs is the problem of equity. As Federal subsidies are applied to plug the
gap between housing costs and a family's ability to pay, the number of Ameri
can Families who are receiving large Federal subsidy payments to assist them
in buying or renting a place to live is increasing rapidly. By the end of fiscal
year 1972, 2 million or more families probably will be receiving housing sub
sidy under one or another of the many Federal programs. The amount of such
subsidies range as high as $2,400 per family per year.
Quite obviously, these subsidy programs present the Federal Government
with serious problems of social equity. In spite of rapidly increasing produc
tion, the families receiving subsidies are among the fortunate few compared to
the universe of families who are potentially eligible. Under present law, as
many as 25 million American households-40 percent of the total population
are eligible for the major subsidy programs. If all eligible families were subsi
dized the cost would be astronomical. Yet unless major changes are made, as
these programs continue to gain production momentum, it will be difficult to
continue favoring a select few in the population while the rest of the Nation is
left to seek decent housing completely on its own. Since it is doubtful that the
public, and hence the Congress, will be prepared (p. 24) to accept the staggering
budgetary cost of a more global coverage toward which present housing subsidy
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In 1981 in his first major address to an industry group, Secretary
of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop
ment, Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., stated that the new construction pro
gram was grossly expensive, that the subsidized housing debt in 1980
was 220 billion dollars, that "regardless of what we do it would be
over a quarter of a trillion dollars by the end of 1982, that it had not
been effective in meeting the needs of housing the poor and it was,
therefore, to be scaled back."95
An additional problem is that transportation in the suburbs is
relegated almost exclusively to the private automobile or the public
taxi. Both are beyond the economic resources of the poor. In the
cities, the poor have long clustered in corridors along public trans
port routes. With two cars being the norm in suburban America it is
not realistic to assume that the poor, even if transplanted, would
have adequate mobility.
Even assuming the desirability of artificially encouraging the
poor to move to the suburbs zoning is not an effective tool to achieve
it. For those who may envision local governments building or subsi
dizing low-cost housing there can only be disappointment. Justice
Mountain of the Supreme Court of New Jersey dissenting in Oak
wood stated it well:
In MI. Laurel we said, "Courts do not build housing nor do
municipalities". . . . Today the majority repeats, "Municipalities
do not themselves have the duty to build or subsidize hous
ing". . . . This I take to be settled doctrine, which should not, I
submit, be altered in any way except by legislation. This comment
is provoked by the plethora of suggestions that have arisen on all
sides demanding various kinds of immediate and far-reaching af
programs may be forced to head, the time to make needed changes is rapidly
approaching.
Two additional elements in the present housing subsidy programs intensify
the social equity dilemma oftoo many applicants for a limited amount of funds.
One is the emphasis placed on linking the Federal subsidy almost exclusively to
newly constructed housing units. This emphasis arises out of the desire to use
Federal subsidies to provide as much stimulus as possible to housing produc
tion. But the result is that eligible families in many communities are moving
into brand new homes on which they make relatively modest payments while
other families in similar--<>r maybe even slightly better-basic economic cir
cumstances are left struggling to meet their monthly payments in older homes
purchased without subsidy.
Meso"agefrom tlte President of tlte United States Transmilling The Third Annual Report on
National Housing Goals, Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 1603 of the Housing &
Urban Development Act of 1968, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
95. Lawyers Title News, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 17, col. 3.
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firmative action-kinds of action that if undertaken would require
the exercise of some unspecified municipal power, but certainly
not the zoning power. 96

D.

I~

There Employment for the Poor in the Suburbs?

Though writers and courts have decried the inability of the un
employed poor to live in the suburbs supposedly convenient to avail
able employment,97 seemingly no study has been done to establish
that they do generally have the skills level or the discipline essential
to the prospective employment.
At this time the substantial number of skilled individuals unem
ployed would indicate that a move to the suburbs of the unskilled
poor is simply a shift of the problem of unemployment from one
location to another. Strongly supportive of this probability is the
position taken by the National Federation of Independent Busi
nesses. This group, one that might logically be expected to give sub
stantial support to the Reagan administration's enterprise zone
concept for the inner city, has opposed it for highly cogent reasons:
In a recent policy statement, the federation said taxes were
among the least important problems cited by small businesses that
attempt to establish themselves in blighted areas. Far more im
portant concerns, it said, are crime, costs of insurance and energy,
high interest rates and the inability 10 hire qualtfied employees. 98

The very existence of government-sponsored low income hous
ing, as opposed to housing built on the open market, detracts from
the availability of jobs because it tends to drive business as well as
people from the environs. 99 The industry that many would like to
96. 72 N.J. at 630, 371 A.2d at 1267.
97. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398 (citing N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969,
at 39 (city ed.».
98. Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 27, 1982, at 13, col. I (emphasis added).
99. The following assessment of this situation was made by the City of
Philadelphia:
According to the 1980 Census, Philadelphia had a total of 684,298 residential
units which provided housing for its 1,688,000 people. 61 % of these units were
owner occupied; 39% were occupied by renters. Since World War II a combi
nation of factors have produced a trend of housing abandonment and decreased
housing availability for low and moderate income persons: suburbanization,
loss of employment, increases of housing costs, vandalism, inavailability of
financing in some areas, and over accessibility of financing in others. In 1980
the City Department of Licenses and Inspections located 22,071 vacant struc
tures in the city. These structures were usually severely dilapidated, open to the
elements or boarded up. Most of the vacants were either rental structures or
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pursue with low income housing has in many instances already left
the city in part at least because of the social problems associated with
some of the occupants of that housing. Even a cursory visual exami
nation of major low income housing sites in the American city will
show that all too often such industry or business as was there before
the advent of the housing has moved either to the suburbs or to a
safer location someplace else in the city.
If low-income individuals had the skills and job discipline to
offer to industry, the incentive for it to remain in the city would be
greatly enhanced. Further, if they did have the skills and discipline
to make them desirable employees in the suburbs the tremendous
number of such unemployed individuals ready and willing to work
would have created something akin to the economic miracle of Hong
Kong in the inner city. The problem would not be to move low
income housing to the suburbs in order to achieve jobs for the unem
ployed poor. It would be to make proper adjustment for the vast
industrial and business enterprises flowing into the inner-city to take
advantage of the labor market.
These considerations obviously have very little relevance to ex
clusionary zoning decisions forcing multiple unit housing on the pri
vate market. It is safe to assume that those to purchase such housing
generally have marketable skills and/or education.
E. Expensive to Society to Move Poor to Suburbs

To the extent that exclusionary zoning decisions result in new
construction in the suburbs to encourage citizens to leave those cities
or towns where a housing surplus exists, as it does throughout most
of the nation,l°O an unwarranted expense is being placed on the pub
lic. This is because new construction is expensive and the new hous
larger single family residences. Overwhelmingly, they were concentrated in the
areas north of Center City and in low and moderate income areas in general.
The number of long-term vacant structures constitute approximately 4.4% of
the total number of residential structures in the city which exceed 500,000. Of
the vacant structures approximately 25-30% are 2 story, 2-4 bedroom, properties
which are structurally intact and suitable for acquisition and rehabilitation
activities.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ApPLICATION (June
1982).
100. The Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development noted
recently that "there is no nationwide shortage in the rental housing market. Note that I
said nationwide; the study found clear evidence of market shortages in some areas, offset
by actual surpluses of rental units in others." Lawyers Title News, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 17.
The question still remains whether it is desirable to encourage the unemployed and
unemployable to utilize surplus housing and as to why the housing has become surplus.
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ing makes that abandoned in the city surplus. As of April, 1982, the
national weighted average for new homes was 95,700 dollars as op
posed to 69,100 dollars for existing homes. lOl New construction car
ried out under federal sponsorship is no less expensive and all factors
considered is probably substantially more costly than private sector
housing. 102 Perhaps somewhat representative of the cost of govern
ment sponsored housing is the report of the Office of Housing and
Community Development in the city of Philadelphia; it has been
spending an average of 60,000 to 90,000 dollars to rehabilitate a sin
gle home. I03
In addition, existing private sector housing in the American city
tends to be substantially less expensive than that available in the
suburbs. For instance, in the city of Reading, Pennsylvania the aver
age sale price for inner-city homes in i982 has thus far been 24,335
dollars as opposed to 55,613 dollars in the county surrounding the
101. Telephone interview with Lawrence David, Economics Analyst, Federal
Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh (June 1982).
102. One report stated:
By any measure, HUD's figures on the multi-family effort are staggering. In
the last eleven years loans to the government exceeded $1 billion-the agency's
books are too jumbled to get a precise figure. Failures equaled about 10 percent
of the projects insured, a default rate that might have driven private lenders to
bankruptcy.
Reading Eagle, May 2, 1982, at 19, col. 5.
Secretary Pierce of the Department of Housing and Urban Development stated:
One of the central conclusions I have come to in my own thinking is that
the § 8 new construction program simply is not appropriate to our present re
sources and needs. Over the years, the cost of such housing assistance has be
come absolutely prohibitive. Taken together with other outlays, § 8 pushed our
outstanding subsidized housing debt to 220 billion by the end of 1980.
By the end of 1982, regardless of what we do, that debt will climb to over a
quarter of a trillion dollars. Not only has § 8 been expensive, it has not been
effective in meeting the needs of housing the poor. It is our intention, accord
ingly, to scale back § 8 severely. . . . Iful/y expect that HUD will be supporting
far, far less building then it has in the past.
Lawyers Title News, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 17, col. 3 (emphasis added).
Housing being constructed under court order can be astonishingly expensive. In
Philadelphia, the Bulletin reported the following cost of the court-mandated Whitman
Project at a point in time when the cost escalation was far from complete:
The bottom line is in keeping with the season. Red as holly berries. The per
unit cost of the project's 120 townhouses-now get this--is going from
$87,672.79 to $119,583.33. An increase of $31,910.46 since the no-bid contract
was negotiated last December 21. Inflation? That had already been figured in.
Gold plating? Marble bathrooms, parquet floors? Not a bit of it. Still the same
brick-and-clapboard, three-room houses.
The Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1980, at B 7 (quoting Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126
(Jrd Cir. 1977».
103. The Temple News, (philadelphia) Apr. 14, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
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city of Reading. 104 Or, compare 18,200 dollars as the median price
of homes sold in the city of Philadelphia in 1981 to 95,700 dollars for
a newly constructed home in the same city:105
Construction costs alone do not reflect the total cost of building
new housing. The total utility infrastructure must be factored in.
The major cities that are currently losing population already have a
utility infrastructure that is extremely expensive to duplicate in the
suburbs. The citizens already living in a municipality subject to
court mandated housing must bear a substantial portion of the costs
of sewers, roads, schools and other service facilities to support new
construction.
The government programs essential to move the poor to the
suburbs are so expensive they will not be adequately funded .to ac
complish the intended end. Whether it is done in the public or pri
vate sector, only the most compelling reasons would justify the
building of new housing in order to abandon the old.
F. Exclusionary Zoning Decisions Are Unpopular
Another major reason for judicial reluctance to assume zoning
responsibilities is because the decisions are both unpopular and con
travene sound zoning principles which, because of their inherent
value, are held dear by the American public. That public, of course,
includes the judiciary. Maintenance of property values is often
trampled by exclusionary zoning decisions. Berman v. Parker 106 and
Belle Terre, 107 recognized the extreme breadth of action permissible
under the police power to protect those values. In Belle Terre, Jus
tice Douglas speaking for the majority stated:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles are restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use pro
ject addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one
within Berman v. Parker. . . . The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
layout zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people. 108
104. The Reading Eagle, Apr. 18, 1982, at I, col. 3.
105. Telephone interview with Philadelphia Planning Commission based on tapes
of 1980 Census.
106. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
107. 416 U.S. at 1.
108. Id at 9.
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Because exclusionary zoning decisions virtually always infringe
on these values to some degree, there is no place where such deci
sions are welcomed by those who live in the area to be affected. 109 If
the decision relates to government-sponsored housing as opposed
simply to a prohibition of large lot zoning or an insistence that town
houses be permitted along with other multiunit housing, the resist
ance is even more vigorous and sustained. For instance, in Joseph
Ski/ken & Co. v. City of To/edo 110 a proposal to permit greater hous
ing density met serious opposition only at such time as it was discov
ered that the change in zoning was to accommodate government
sponsored housing.
The courts have not been oblivious to the injury resulting from
placing low-income housing in neighborhoods. In Ski/ken the pro
posed change from 20,000 square feet per lot to 6,000 square feet for
the purpose of erecting single-family detached dwellings under gov
ernment sponsorship was thoroughly denounced by the Sixth
Circuit:
Under this broad order all zoning laws in conflict therewith
would be invalidated. Low cost public housing could move into
the most exclusive neighborhoods in the metropolitan area and
property values would be slaughtered. Innocent people who la
bored hard all of their lives and saved their money to purchase
homes in nice residential neighborhoods, and who never discrimi
nated against anyone, would be faced with a total change in their
neighborhoods, with the values of their properties slashed. All of
109. The loss of an election in New Jersey, where the primary thrust has been to
secure housing for those of low and moderate income, illustrates the public attitude.
Morris County, New Jersey was the site in 1982 of housing litigation supported by the
then incumbent Democratic administration as well as by gubernatorial candidate James
J. Florio. The housing was opposed by the ultimately successful Republican candidate
Thomas H. Kean who carried the county by 45,455 votes. This was by far his largest
margin in any of the 21 counties that he carried. As stated by the Philadelphia Inquirer,
"[w)hen Florio lost the contest by fewer than 2,000 votes statewide, he said that one of
the major reasons his plan had been thrown offhad been Kean's overwhelming victory in
Morris County." Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 31, 1982, at BI, col. 6.
In the early 1970's the Department of Housing and Urban Development recognized
the impossibility of controlling crime in the now infamous Pruitt-Igoe high-rise project in
St. Louis and dynamited a large portion of the structures. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1972, at
45, col. 8.
In a recent study done by the Committee of 70, a political watchdog group in Phila
delphia. Pennsylvania, a 76 page "Housing Governance Study" was conducted wherein
the group concluded that public housing projects "are so studiously avoided, it is as if
they were surrounded by moats with alligators in them." Philadelphia Daily News, Apr.
13, 1982, at 5, col. 5.
110. 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
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this would be accomplished simply by an order of a Federal
Judge, and at the expense of the taxpayers. 11 I
Though the strength of this rhetoric has not been noted elsewhere
and undoubtedly the government sponsorship was a significant fac
tor in its intensity, it is fundamental that rezoning to permit greater
density diminishes the value of those properties in the area restricted
to the older zoning standard.
In Karlan v. Harris, 112 the Second Circuit in partial response to
the following admission by HUn held in an action under the Na
tional Environmental Policy Act, that HUn had failed to comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 13 ap
proving a seventeen-story building exclusively for those of low
income:
For example, attitudes of low-income and minority persons to
ward street life are frequently conditioned by the economic limita
tions on their mobility and by their cultural heritage. Their use of
public space is often in conflict with the values of middle and up
per-class people, mobile and able to spend leisure time away from
home. Differing social and cultural attitudes about territoriality
and privacy, accoustica1 as well as spatial, could fuel the tension
which excessively close physical relationships between 'vest pock
et' projects and high-cost housing might generate. 1l4
For those who choose not to read footnotes, it is noted that the court
was reversed for its concern because HUn had already addressed
that concern, all that is necessary under NEPA.

G. Exclusionary Zoning Decisions Contravene Legitimate Zoning
Principles
Site-specific relief frustrates comprehensive planning. To the
extent that a constitutional challenge results in a mandate that the
governmental body alter its zoning structure so as to comport with
judicial views, as often done in New Jersey, the conflict with sound
planning is relatively limited. Though the government may be
forced to provide for uses that are not preferred it can within some
reason determine the extent, scope, and location of those uses and
can thereby relate the changes intelligently to the comprehensive
Ill. ld at 880-81.
112. 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978), re,,'d, 444 U.S. 223 (1978) (quoting HUD, DISPER
SAL OF Low INCOME UNITS ON MORE SITES A-71 (1977».
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
114. 590 F.2d at 43.
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plan and existing zoning ordinance. Where, however, as is custom
ary in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,115 site specific relief is
consistently granted as a matter of reward to the developer, the con
flict with sound planning is more often than not direct and extremely
disruptive. The mold is less clear in New York because of the lim
ited amount of litigation but both general rezoning under court su
pervision and site specific relief have been granted there. 116
In New Jersey, the initial tendency of the judiciary was to per
mit the municipality to revise its zoning ordinance to comport with .
the desires of the court, but the reluctance of those governing bodies
to read the court's directives in a fashion consonant with their own
preferences has resulted in site specific relief there as well as in Penn
sylvania. A prime example is Oakwood l17 where, as noted, after
some six years of litigation the state supreme court ultimately
granted site specific relief to the developer, while at the same time
maintaining a continuing supervision over rezoning the township.
A developer wants to maximize profits. His choice of a place to
build is based primarily on that single consideration rather than
public interest as reflected by the comprehensive plan or zoning ordi
nance. To the best of his ability he will choose that land where the
greatest profit can be made from rezoning it to permit greater density
of development. If there is high density zoning, say four-acre, then it
is clearly to the developer's advantage to challenge in that sector in
order to take advantage of the gain derived from converting land
valued for one unit per four acres to one unit per acre.
One example is the landmark decision in National Land. liS As
discussed, the developer sought to rezone land providing for one unit
per four acres to one unit per acre. The developer was successful
even though some thirty-five percent of the township was already
zoned for one house to the acre and largely undeveloped. The devel
oper could have purchased land and developed in the thirty-five per
cent of the township where the zoning density desired by him was
available pursuant to the terms of the ordinance. The per acre cost
of that land zoned for one house per acre would, of course, have
been significantly higher than that in the four-acre sector.
It is indefensible to permit the developer to pursue this course to
the detriment of comprehensive planning. What the developer does
115.
116.
117.
118.

See, e.g., Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 415 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 102, 341 N.E.2d at 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
72 N.J. at 481,371 A.2d at 1192.
419 Pa. at 504, 215 A.2d at 597.
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is tantamount to spot-zoning and is anathema to the entire. concept
of legitmate comprehensive zoning. In fact, more often than not, be
cause of the economic incentive, such a course of action is going to
be diametrically opposed to comprehensive planning. Low density
zoning ordinarily bears a rational relationship to availability of
schools, sewers, road networks C!nd public need.
Because zoning continues to restrain adjacent property owners,
the developer gains a windfall in terms of the neighbors' open space
while additional stress is placed on public facilities that were not
planned for high density development. If the new development is
too large for the existing service infrastructure, then the municipality
must furnish adequate sewerage, roads or other public services
needed for the random development. This would appear to be true
even though such infrastructure has already been developed in an- .
other portion of the township planned for higher density
development.
H.

Deference to Legislative Judgment

As observed in the California decision of Associated
Homebuilders v. Livermore,lI9 New Jersey and Pennsylvania have
refused to show traditional deference to legislative judgment in such
decisions as Mount Laurel and In re Girsh:
We conclude from these Federal decisions that when an ex
clusionary ordinance is challenged under the [F]ederal due pro
cess clause, the standard of constitutional adjudication remains
that set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Co.,. . . . [I]f it is fairly debata
ble that the ordinance is reasonably related to the public welfare,
the ordinance is constitutional. A number of recent decisions
from courts of other states, however, have declined to accord the
traditional deference to legislative judgment in the review of ex
clusionary ordinances, and ruled that communities lacked author
ity to adopt such ordinances. Plaintiff urges that we apply the
standards of review employed in those decisions in passing upon
the instant ordinance. l20

The court accurately concluded:
Most zoning and land use ordinances affect population
119. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
120. Id at 606,557 P.2d at 486-87, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55 (citations omitted). For
an excellent analysis of judicial restraint, see Kolis, Citadel of Privilege: Exclusionary
Land Use Regulations and the Presumption of Conditional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 585 (1981).
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growth and density.... As commentators have observed, to in
sist that such zoning laws are invalid unless the interests support
ing the exclusion are compelling in character, and cannot be
achieved by an alternative method, would result in wholesale in
validation of land use controls and endanger the validity of city
and regional planning. . . . "Were a court to . . . hold that an
inferred right of any group to live wherever it chooses might not
be abridged without some compelling state interest, the law of
zoning would be literally turned upside down; presumptions of
validity would become presumptions of invalidity and traditional
police powers of a state would be severely circumscribed."121
The law is, of course, what the courts ultimately say it is. They
are as a practical matter, unlike the legislature, the ultimate arbiter.
For this reason, if for no other, the scope of their responsibilities
might be likened to those of a fiduciary. It is fundamental that a
fiduciary must act solely and exclusively in the interest of the benefi
ciary and is held to the very highest degree of restraint in discharging
that responsibility. Because there is nobody to second guess the judi
ciary and because it is not readily responsive to the political system
in order that the disaffected may make their convictions known, the
judiciary should' act only when there is a matter of law to be deter
mined and not where there is a sociological preference to be
expressed.
Judge Arlin M. Adams of the Third Circuit has probably ad
dressed the broad issue of judicial restraint as well as may be done:
"Democracy-and the judicial system in our democracy-will not,
in my view, succumb to assassination. But it may succumb to an
erosion of confidence from the disruptive and unwise arrogation of
legislative power by institutions not suited to its exercise."122 With
respect to exclusionary zoning the principle has been exceedingly
well-expressed in Confederacion de la Raza Unida 123 where the court
responded to an attempt to invalidate local zoning on the grounds of
the supremacy of the Federal Housing Act Law and the fourteenth
amendment by stating:
We thus reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims as set forth in
the first amended complaint. We must do so with full recognition
that the courts have traditionally recognized that zoning matters
121. Associated Homebuilders, 18 Cal. 3d at 603,557 P.2d at 485, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
53 (citations omitted).
122. 72 N.J. at 636, 371 A.2d at 1270 (Clifford, J., concurring, quoting Adams,
Judicial Restraint, The Best Medicine, 60 JUDICATURE 179, 182 (1976).
123. 324 F. Supp. at 895.
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are of particular concern to, and the province of, the local commu
nities involved and that the courts should interfere with the judg
ment of the local authorities only in the most extreme cases, and
under the most extreme circumstances. This attitude goes back at
least as far as Village 0/ Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., . . . which
plaintiffs rightly describe as the "landmark case" in the whole
field. 124
In New Jersey there is apparently an increasing awareness on
the part of the supreme court of that state that they may have
grabbed a cat-by-the-tail without fully understanding its dimensions
and proclivities. In the 1977 Oakwood decision, the majority stated:
We take this occasion to make explicit what we adumbrated
in Mount Laurel and intimated above-that the governmental so
ciological-economic enterprise of seeing to the provision and al
location throughout appropriate regions of adequate and suitable
housing for all categories of the population is much more appro
priately a legislative and administrative function rather than a ju
dicial function to be exercised in the disposition of isolated
cases. 12S
However, in spite of this recognition, not truly convincingly ex
pressed by the majority theretofore, a divided court determined that
Oakwood had not come up with a plan to meet its fair-share. One
concurring opinion called for more stringent action; two concurring
and dissenting opinions and a one-third concurring opinion sug
gested that the matter might more appropriately be left to the
legislature.
Justices Schreiber and Mountain, concurring and dissenting,
and Justice Clifford, concurring: All called for a searching analysis
of the separation of powers doctrine in relation to New Jersey's ex
clusionary zoning decisions. In his concurring and dissenting opin
ion, Justice Mountain raised a significant consideration by quoting
from a recent law review article:
The desirability of a judicial remedy cannot be assessed with
out considering, for example, the potential for undesirable perma
nent alteration of the municipality that is inherent in any decision
to rezone. A court that concludes it has unwisely ordered busing
to desegregate a school system can easily correct its error by with
drawing or altering its order.

124. Id at 897 (citations omitted).
125. 72 N.J. at 534, 371 A.2d at 1218.

1982)

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

581

When a court rezones, however, buildings may be erected and de
velopment plans previously under consideration may be aban
doned. Thus, unlike courts that reapportion to secure an effective
political process or employ busing as a temporary measure to de
segregate schools until society develops integrated and equal
school facilities, the court that rezones makes a decision for the
community that may not be subject to effective revision. 126

In Pennsylvania, the other state suffering a multitude of exclu
sionary zoning litigation, no comparable division and concern has
been expressed in recent years. The Pennsylvania courts appear to
be relatively comfortable with their prodeveloper decisions and, as
noted, the majority even went so far in 1977 as to reaffirm the unde
fined Pennsylvania view at least as to the troublesome fair-share
concept.
Legislative deference should relate to both the substantive and
remedial law of exclusionary zoning. Just as no decision has been
found wherein the courts have declined subject matter jurisdiction
over charges of exclusionary zoning, none have been found to hold
that remedy is an exclusive judicial province. To the contrary, often,
as in Oakwood, it has been appropriately treated as primarily a legis
lative responsibility.127 The court ultimately granted site-specific re
lief but even then otherwise continued to treat the remedy as a
legislative matter subject to review. Though the plaintiff was in ef
fect granted rezoning and a building permit by the court, revision of
the township zoning ordinance as further needed to meet the judicial
desire was left with the township subject to further court review. 128
In those jurisdictions that have already concluded on constitu
tional grounds that certain fact patterns are impermissibly exclusive
on the basis of their constitution or because beyond the scope of the
police power, the legislature probably. does not retain the option to
preempt substantive judicial decisions. But it is not clear that the
legislatures may not preempt or significantly control the remedy
once a judicial determination of exclusionary zoning has been made.
In Pennsylvania a legislative effort to control the· scope of sub
stantive review has been largely unsuccessful. In October of 1978,
the legislature passed a bill providing that even though the courts
had made a determination that zoning was in fact exclusionary they
126. Id. at 627,371 A.2d at 1265 (quoting Note, The Inadequacy ofJudicial Reme
dies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REv. 760, 774-77 (1976».
127. Oakwood, 72 N.J. at 534, 371 A.2d at 1218.
128. Id. at 553-54, 371 A.2d at 1228.
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should have the power to invalidate the exclusionary ordinance only
if
the municipality ha[d] not acted in good faith or made a bona.fide
attempt in the adoption of its ordinances or maps, or any amend
ments thereto, to meet the statutory and constitutional require
ments for nonexclusionary zoning; or the ordinance imposes
limitations that are not reasonably related to the municipality's
authority to determine its physical growth pattern, protect the
Commonwealth's public natural resources, coordinate develop
ment with the provision of public services, or protect the character
of the community.129
In the decision of Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v.
Golla,130 the court held that the first phrase proclaiming innocent
exclusionary zoning to be constitutional and the second phrase pur
porting to restrict those considerations available to the court in mak
ing a constitutional determination was "an unconstitutional
transgression of the separation of powers." 13l Out of the nine mem
ber court, two of the judges dissented on the ground that the com
monwealth court should not have addressed the merits of the
separation of powers issue until such time as the lower court had
complied with the legislative directive to make findings. 132 Two of
the dissenting opinions argued that deference should be given to the
legislative enactment at the local level and that the presumption of
its constitutionality as nonexclusionary should have been sus
tained. 133 But none actually argued that the act of the state legisla
ture could in fact control the scope ofjudicial review in relation to a
finding of exclusionary zoning. The court left no doubt as to who
has the last word. It is suspected that to the extent, if any, that other
jurisdictions become involved the answer to attempted legislative
curtailment of substantive determinations will be the same.
What the legislature should have done to support comprehen
sive planning was to enact a remedial provision giving the township
the right to restructure an ordinance found to be exclusionary in a
manner that would not accord the special privilege of site-specific
relief. Such relief would appear to be no more than a judicially cre
ated privilege not based on constitutional considerations. Because
the Pennsylvania courts see the need for reward, a provision for at
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § llOll(I)(a)-(b) (Purdon 1972) (emphasis added).
58 Pa. Commw. Ct. 572,428 A.2d 701 (1981).
Id at 585, 428 A.2d at 706.
Id at 594-95, 428 A.2d at 710-11.
Id at 587, 591, 595, 428 A.2d at 707, 709, 711.
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tomey's fees for the successful plaintiff might gain a margin of judi
cial respect for a legislative effort to control the remedial process by
legislatively eliminating site-specific relief.
Thus far in the American political system the populace has not
been conditioned to respond to unpopular activist judicial decisions
by, even where the opportunity presents itself, voting against an in
cumbent judge. This is not true with respect to someone whom they
traditionally think of as being within the political spectrum. There,
in the various legislative bodies, the incumbent must stand responsi
ble to the public for his or her actions. If the courts continue to
interject themselves into what is clearly the legislative arena then
there will be mounting pressure to devise some system to permit the
electorate a more efficacious means of removing those judges who
indulge in unpopular judicial legislation.
This is not to suggest that judges should be subject to removal
for unpopular judicial decisions. That would be in direct and dire
conflict with the fundamental principle that judges often have an ob
ligation to make unpopular decisions in order to sustain the rights of
the minority against infringement by the majority. But, it is to sug
gest that to the extent that the judiciary seeks to substitute itself for
the legislative body, it should be equally accountable to the body
politic in what would prove to be a lamentable politicalization of the
judgmental process.
Perhaps it comes down to what was recognized by the First Cir
cuit in Steel Hill Development, 134 where six-acre zoning was sus
tained. The court invoked NEPA and called for the health and
welfare of man 135 by observing that "if the federal government itself
has thought these concerns to be within the general welfare . . . we
cannot say that Sanbornton cannot similarly consider such values
and reflect them in its zoning ordinance."136 The court then ob
served ''that it could not find the six-acre requirement reasonable if
only health and safety were considered, but that such requirement
was reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare of the
community."137 It would seem that many of our courts have lost
sight of the distinction.

134.
135.
136.
137.

469 F.2d at 956.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
469 F.2d at 961.
Id at 960.
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I. Neither Municipalities Nor Courts Are Qual[fted To Engage In
Regional Planning

The courts that are seeking to force regional planning though
the legislatures have long granted the power to local government
units that are not qualified to do regional planning. In Berenson, the
New York Court of Appeals was open in its demand:
Zoning, as we have previously noted, is essentially a legisla
tive act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a court should be re
quired to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we
look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to
foster the development of programs designed to achieve sound re
gional planning. While the people of New Castle may fervently
desire to be left alone by the forces of change, the ultimate deter
mination is not solely theirs. Whether New Castle should be per
mitted to exclude high density residential development depends
on the facts and circumstances present in the town and the com
munity at large. Until the day comes when regional, rather than
local, governmental units can make such determinations, the
courts must assess the reasonableness of what the locality has
done. That is what remains to be considered upon the trial in this
case.l38

The state legislature in New York apparently does not favor regional
planning. After some experimentation,139 with overriding local zon
ing law through a state agency called the Urban Development Cor
poration (UDC), the legislature has chosen to leave the power of
zoning with local municipalities.
In Pennsylvania the directive of the supreme court to the legis
lature was only slightly less specific. After having just legislated the
right to planned unit development as a new and existing planning
technique, contrary to well-established law, in Eheney v. Village 2 at
New Hope, Inc. ,140 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Con
138. 38 N.Y.2d at III, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
139. In 1968, the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was
created to promote the policies of the New York State Urban Development Act. N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6265 to 6285 (1973). Included in its grant of powers to effect these
policies was the power of the corporation to overrule local zoning ordinances. As a result
of widespread opposition to this authority to overrule local zoning ordinances, the legis
lature in 1973 curtailed the power of the UDC. Id § 6265(5). The Corporation's zoning
overrule authority as it affected residential projects in towns and incorporated villages
was limited. The amendment provides that unless and until objections made by gov
erning bodies of towns and villages have been withdrawn the proposed project may not
go forward. Seemingly, objections might never be withdrawn.
140. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
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cord Township 141 stated:
New and exciting techniques are available to the local governing
bodies of this Commonwealth for dealing with the problems of
population growth. Neither Concord Township nor Easttown
Township nor any other local governing unit may retreat behind a
cover of exclusive zoning. We fully realize that the overall solu
tion to these problems lies with greater regional planning; but un
til the time comes that we have such a system we must confront
the situation as it is. The power currently resides in the hands of
each local governing unit, and we will not tolerate their abusing
that power in attempting to zone out growth at the expense of
neighboring communities. 142

In New Jersey, the courts are telling townships as to the type of re
gion that they must plan for.143
Neither New York nor Pennsylvania courts have indicated
clearly whether the change should involve a legislative mandate that
local bodies do regional planning, or that the power to plan be
placed in legislatively created regional rather than local bodies. The
latter would seemingly involve a complete restructuring of local gov
ernment honored by some two hundred years of continuity. The
legislatures have over a long period of years declined to do either.
They clearly favor local as opposed to regional control and appear to
have little interest in forcing impractical regional planning on local
bodies with local interests and limited resources. . And, of course,
absent an unidentified constitutional infirmity, the power to make
that determination lies with the legislature and not the courts. Seem
ingly, the courts recognize that fact. The result is that with the legis
lature saying one thing, the courts saying another, and the local
bodies not capable and generally not inclined in any event to do
regional planning, the burden is devolving on the courts.
In addition, the courts are less prepared to carry out regional
zoning than are the multitudinous local bodies. Pennsylvania will be
used to illustrate. There are 2,571 municipal government units with
the power to zone. Of those only some 1,334 have planning commis
sions and that, of course, is ordinarily an unpaid civic function.
Though there are some professionals on the larger municipal staffs
no significant portion of the 2,571 units have professionals on their
141. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
142. Id at 470, 268 A.2d at 769. It is interesting that the court predicated its deci
sion on what the court could or would not "tolerate" rather than on any existing princi
ple of law.
143. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. at 151,336 A.2d at 713.
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staff. Only about one-half of third class cities, fifty-one to be exact,
have professional staff. Though all counties have planning commis
sions not all have professional staff. l44 Of course, the Pennsylvania
Legislature has not empowered counties to carry out zoning func
tions except in the absence of local planning by municipalities. 145
The question has to be asked as to which of the 2,570 other
municipalities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania each munici
pality must plan for? Does the planning take place with those to the
north, south, east or west, or in all directions, and if so, how far in
any or all directions? Must the planning include factors generated or
emanating from territory across state borders? If we assume that any
ten municipalities are to be planned for in relation to the regional
responsibility of anyone, then is it accurate to suggest that we might
have as many as ten or twenty other municipalities each planning in
relation to the ten? Does a municipality on the border of one region
plan in relation to municipalities in other regions? In other words,
where are the regions, where does a local government draw the lines
and at what cost does it assume such repetitive, broad, and far-reach
ing responsibilites often inherently inconsistent with its own
interests?
Even if regional planning were to become a reality based on
municipalities joining together,l46 there would still remain the prob
lem of delineating the regions that they must plan for. Interestingly,
it might be possible for them to do legally what cannot be done le
gally now, at least in Pennsylvania. For instance, if eight townships
planned together, they might permit townhouses, commonly occu
pied by the poor, in only one, two, or three of those townships. The
courts would then be forced to face a rejection of the regional plan
ning concept or accept economic stratification. If they rejected the
right of a region to so plan, then it would be clear that their commit
ment is to economic or social integration rather than to the right of
those of lesser income to live in the suburbs. It would also be clear
that the courts are not serious about independent regional planning.
If there are legal reasons, or even sufficiently compelling public pol
icy considerations, for the courts to mandate that every municipality
144. Telephone interview with Dan Herbster, Chief of Municipal Statistics and
Records Division of the Dept. of Community Affairs of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
145. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10602 (Purdon 1972).
146. It was not until 1978 that the Pennsylvania legislature acted to explicitly per
mit multiple municipalities to plan together. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11101 A (Purdon
1972).
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have its fair-share, why should it be presumptively possible that re
gional planning defeat exactly that concept?
If it is a prickly question as to the scope of regional planning
responsibilities for municipalities, then it is a doubly prickly ques
tion for the courts. The local municipality at least has been dele
gated the responsibility by the legislature, has the advantage of
familiarity with its territory, people, and politics, and is in a position
to make the discretionary concessions and decisions called for by the
legislative process. Until such time as the courts decided that the
local citizens had an obligation to plan on a regional basis, the re
sources and interest adequate to some reasonable planning level was
present in the local municipality. Technical expertise was usually
available from the county planning commission.
The courts are generally bereft of local knowledge, especially in
the case of 2,571 jurisdictions, and have no responsibility or practical
capacity to take into consideration discretionary political factors. In
the last analysis, a court must make the determination as to whether
court mandated regional responsibilities have been met. At best, the
court's capacity to do that is limited; as aptly set forth by Justice
Mountain in his dissenting opinion in Oakwood:
Quite apart from the uncertain efficacy of this newly fomlU
lated rule, there are a number of reasons why courts should ab
stain from seeking ultimate solutions to this area, but should
rather urge a legislative, or a legislative-administrative approach.
In the first place courts are not equipped for the task. If a court
goes beyond a declaration of validity or invalidity with respect to
the land use legislation of a particular municipal body, it invites
the fairly certain prospect of being required itself to undertake the
tasks of rezoning. Of course it has neither the time, the compe
tence nor the resources to enter upon such an undertaking. It
must therefore appoint planning experts to do the work for it. . . .
A principal weakness inherent in this approach is that no authori
tative guidelines exist at the present to aid the trial judge and the
planning experts he has appointed, and to which the law would
require that they adhere. Therefore a land use plan so devised
will reflect rather the informed judgment of the chosen expert than
a judicial application of settled principle to particular facts. Full
realization of this is likely further to diminish the probability of
community acceptance. 147
147. Oakwood, 72 N.J. at 625-26,371 A.2d at 1264-65. (Mountain, J., concurring
& dissenting). Court appointed experts were not entrusted by the legislature any more

than was the judiciary to carry out the zoning function, nor were they elected by the local
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Most trial judges have no more than one or two briefing clerks
trained in the law. Few judges or briefing clerks are trained as plan
ners. It can be assumed that none of those responsible for judicial
decisions or research in relation to those decisions are going to have
any substantial personal knowledge of the complex consideration
that should go into what admittedly constitutes legislative compre
hensive planning. This is especially true when there is the possibility
that anyone of a thousand municipalities might be the defendant.
Moving to the appellate courts in Pennsylvania as an example, they
are faced with the possibility of making a decision with respect to
anyone of better than 2,500 units. We cannot expect efficient, effec
tive, sagacious or acceptable planning at any judicial level.
The expense of planning for a relatively small township, known
to the planners, even though they are probably laymen is one thing.
The expense of engaging in the type of comprehensive planning that
needs to be done for a regional area, taking into consideration a non
defined geographical sector of vast proportions and multiple govern
mental units subject to second-guessing by the courts in what has
developed as a concommitant to the planning process, is another.
In determining the type of resources that would be necessary to
effective regional planning by either court or municipality, it might
be instructive to look at the size and cost of operation of one plan
ning commission in the State of Pennsylvania. The Bucks County
Planning Commission, with a budget of 1,064,943 dollars in 1982 has
40 employees. Twenty-four of these employees have degrees in
either planning or architecture. 148 Forgetting for the moment that
zoning is as much an exercise in democracy as in expertise, these
figures indicate the quantity and quality of resources essential to re
gional planning in terms of expertise. Recognition by the courts of
the political nature of zoning, and that neither the courts nor local
citizens wherein the legislature did choose to make the ultimate repository of power as
recognized in City of Eastlake v. First City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
The theme is not new. In Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir.
1974), the court stated that the affirmative provisions in a decree "should be no greater
than required because courts are ill-equipped to administrate the details of a municipal
ity's affairs." Id at 1249. The same court reiterated that philosophy a year later in Jo
seph Ski/ken & Co. Chief Judge Phillips indicated that the requirement that Toledo
develop a sweeping plan of affirmative action is unnecessary in this case. More impor
tant, it would deeply involve the District Court in complex and delicate problems of city
planning that are best left to the municipal government and to the various administrative
agencies.
528 F.2d at 882.
148. Telephone interview with Robert Moore, Executive Director, Bucks County
Planning Commission, April 13, 1980.
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governing bodies have the needed resources, could well account for
the limited spread of the exclusionary zoning doctrine.
One other important factor that should be looked to before the
courts assume zoning responsibility is the capacity of the courts to
translate their policy into reality. Handing down planning decisions
that have no appreciable effect is no planning at all. In New Jersey,
for example, the courts have been singularly unsuccessful in doing
anything about providing low-income housing through random in
validation of the local legislative process, based on where lawsuits
happen to be brought.
Not only did it take seven years for the developer to get defini
tive relief in Ookwood l49 but no housing has ever been built since
Mount Laurel,lso and the matter along with five other consolidated
decisions is once again pending before the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.ISI
Alan Mallach, planning expert, commentator,IS2 and an ardent
advocate of judicial intervention, has acknowledged that exclusion
ary zoning litigation has had only modest measurable impact to date.
This statement is not easy either to document or controvert. It is,
nonetheless, the consensus of those engaged in such litigation, at
least in New Jersey (which has had, most probably, more such
litigation than any other state) that any change in the character of
suburban development resulting from MI. Laurel and its succes
sors is modest in the extreme. Indeed, one interesting observation
is that the percentage of new suburban development that is in
multifamily units, which one might assume would increase as a
result of MI. Laurel, has actually declined, from 50 percent of all
units from 1972-1974 to only 32 percent of all units from 1976
1978. This is, of course, a function of a variety of economic fac
tors unrelated to zoning per se..
IS3
149. 72 N.J. at 481,371 A.2d at 1192.
150. 67 N.J. at 151,336 A.2d at 713 (1975).
151. Implementing Mount Laurel appears to involve insurmountable problems.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed in the Fall of 1980 to hear a consolidated
appeal of six lower court exclusionary zoning decisions, possibly to re-evaluate some
principles of Mount Laurel. The court posed a number of questions toward which oral
argument was to be addressed.
.
The original Mount Laurel decision is not technically involved. The case arising out
of the original Mount Laurel decision is commonly called Mount Laurel II. Though the
case was argued in November of 1980, and additional argument was held in December of
1980 the decision has not come down as of the submission of this manuscript. Telephone
interview with spokesman for the Supreme Court of New Jersey, June 16, 1982.
152. Mallach, supra note 58.
153. Id at 277 n.4.
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It has always been a limitation on the police power that the
means adopted by the legislature must be reasonably calculated to
achieve the ends sought. As recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York: 154
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the
Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental
regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exer
tion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be ac
complished by methods consistent with due process. And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained. 155
If the courts are going to invade the legislative realm is it asking too
much that they be held to the same standard as the legislature?

J. Federal Decisions Do Not Support Exclusionary Zoning
Doctrine
If, as determined in Lindsey v. Normet,156 there is no constitu
tional right to housingl57 it is doubly difficult to envision either a
constitutional right to live in a given municipality, obviously in
housing, irrespective of whether the claimant has ever lived or
worked there, or given the latter, the right to have better housing in
the same municipality.
In an area dependent in significant part on the assertion of con
stitutional principles to invalidate otherwise valid legislative enact
ments, the insistence of the federal judiciary, especially the United
States Supreme Court, on recognizing the validity of local legislative
action has severely retarded the spread of exclusionary zoning deci
sions. The federal courts, by and large, have not been willing to em
brace exclusionary zoning as an integral part of the civil rights
movement.
In 1970 in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v.
City of Union City, 158 a citizen initiated referendum overturning ap
proval of a zoning change made to permit low-income housing was
sustained. In 1971, James v. Valtierra,159 once again sustained the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id at 525 (citations omitted).
405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Id at 74.
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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use of the citizen referendum to reject low-income housing. Golden
v. Planning Board l60 in 1972 upheld the right of a municipality to
exclude to some indeterminate extent by staging its growth.
These decisions were reinforced by the United States Supreme
Court in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises 161 in 1976,
wherein the Court sustained the right of a city to submit proposed
zoning changes to a public referendum. In 1974 in Belle Terre 162 the
Supreme Court gave almost carte blanche under the police power
and sustained the right to exclude nonrelated members of a family
from housing in order to protect family values, which includes the
enjoyment of open space. The Court stressed "that exercise of dis
cretion ... is a legislative, not a judicial, function."163
In 1975, the Court in Warth v. Seldin,l64 held that without a
substantial nexus, such as employment or residence, citizens lacked
standing to litigate the question of exclusionary zoning. Perhaps the
most significant portion of the Warth decision was the Supreme
Court's expression of its concept of federalism when it stated:
We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long con
sidered essential to effective urban planning, are peculiarly within
the province of state and local legislative authorities. They are, of
course, subject to judicial review in a proper case. But citizens
dissatisfied with provisions of such laws need not overlook the
availability of the normal democratic process. 165
By 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De

velopment Corp. ,166 the Supreme Court was willing to hold that dis
parate impact on minorities did not give a right to change the zoning
of the city, absent an intent to discriminate. 167
From the perspective of judicial activists there may be hope
from the Third and Seventh Circuits. Resident AdVisory Board v.
Rizzo 168 held that under title 8 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 dispa
rate impact alone, irrespective of constitutional violation, was suffi
cient grounds to grant relief. 169 In the Metropolitan Housing
160.
409 U.S.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1971), appeal dismissed,
1003 (1972).
426 U.S. 668 (1976).
416 U.S. at 8.
Id
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id at 508 n.18.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Id at 265.
564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977).
Id at 148.
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Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights 170 decision on re
mand, the Seventh Circuit was more conservative but nevertheless
followed the same line suggesting that disparate impact as one factor
combined with other considerations such as some evidence of intent
could constitute a basis for relief. 171
But, no matter how postured, distinguished or minimized, the
high court decisions establish a reasonable expectancy that not one
state decision invalidating zoning as exclusionary would have sur
vived scrutiny under federal constitutional priilciples. It is rumored
that it has gotten so bad that one has to tum to the state courts to get
one's constitutional rights.
Indeed, both New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts have made it
clear that they rely on state grounds. In Pennsylvania, the Federal
Constitution has been cited but in Surrick it was stressed that those
grounds do not include the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 172
K.

Exclusionary Zoning Decisions Do Not Effect Racial
Integration

Undoubtedly one of the generally unspoken reasons behind the
exclusionary zoning decisions, especially in New Jersey, has been a
desire to further integration in a society that is still largely divided
along what would appear to be primarily economic lines but that
nevertheless coincide with race. Perhaps one influence dampening
adoption of the doctrine of exclusionary zoning is a growing convic
tion that there is very little that either government or organized
groups can do to further integration, that where it happens success
fully it is based on personal decisions, capacities and
interrelationships.
It is one thing for an economically successful minority family,
probably with an educational level equivalent to their achievement
in some rough proportion, to decide to buy into a neighborhood con
venient for employment and congenial to their personal taste under
circumstances where everything indicates they would like and are
prepared to become part of the community. It is totally another
thing for the courts to decree contrary to local law that housing
projects are to be built with public funds to be occupied primarily by
people of significantly lower economic and educational levels. The
170. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
171. Id at 1290-94.
172. 476 Pa. at 193 n.lO, 382 A.2d at 110 n.lO.
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individuals who occupy such housing probably did not choose the
community because they wanted to live there but because of cheap
housing. In the ordinary course of events they would never have
purchased homes and chosen to raise their families there or chosen
to work there or to become part of the social fabric. The inducement
of people to live there, usually in great density because the site looks
to government officials to be a place desirable for or vulnerable to
government-sponsored housing, is not necessarily calculated to
achieve positive interpersonal relationships. If the community to be
occupied was theretofore composed of single-family detached dwell
ings, multiunit housing furnished by the government or otherwise is
not going to further integration.
There are, of course, those who have become pessimistic, un
duly in the author's opinion, about our capacity to effect or even
achieve integration. One example of a discouraging effort is the
Concord Park development started just north of the city of Philadel
phia some twenty-eight years ago and designed by the developer to
be an ideal integrated community. Today, The Philadelphia Inquirer
Magazine 173 reported that the development was "envisioned by a
civil rights activist, backed by a Quaker builder and bolstered by
hard-squeezed funds from Philadelphia's Black churches [and that]
the development was hailed internationally as the first community
designed for integration."174 But, the natural equilibrium was upset
from the very beginning because the developer secretly offered
whites special incentives to move into his dream development. To
day further reports:
Today, 28 years later, only five white families remain in the
neighborhood that was supposed to be colorblind, the neighbor
hood that testifies to the hidden force that seems to drive people to
live with members of their own race. And the 'perfect' society?
The case of Concord Park suggests, as do other short-lived exam
ples of racially balanced communities, that blacks and whites will
seldom live together if given the choice. 175

The article quotes Peter Muller, an urban geographer at the
University of Miami who had previously studied Philadelphia's
housing market for some ten years as an associate professor at Tem
ple University, as stating that the phenomena was "a universal thing
173. Diamond, Remnants
zine, Mar. 21, 1982, at 12.

174. Id at 10.
175. Id at 14.

of a

Dream, Today, The Philadelphia Inquirer Maga
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[that] [p]eople tend to form clusters of like-minded people." 176 Like
minded yes, but like-skinned? Saul Alinsky was quoted as saying:
"Integration is simply the time between the arrival of the first blacks
and the departure of the last whites."177
Of Course, a similar side of the coin is, as recognized in the
Glenview Development Co. v. Planning Board 178 case in New Jersey,
that if invalidating the so-called restrictive zoning laws in Franklin
Township did result in more moves into the township then it would
be upper income whites leaving the city:
In short, the lowering of barriers to high-density development in
the rural and semi-rural areas of the State would probably pro
mote and encourage movement of the white middle class from the
traditional urban centers and their surrounding suburbs. A con
tinuation and aggravation of that movement would tend to exac
erbate currently existing social and economic divisions and would
probably severely hamper an urban renaissance.l 79

Since the vast majority of exclusionary zoning cases have in
volved middle or upper income housing it is probable that to the
extent there has been any impact on integration, it has been negative.
The racial imbalance in the cities has been, if anything, intensified.

v.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the extensive coverage by the media and academics,
it is clear that after seven years Mount Laurel has had very limited
impact on the decisional process across the nation. A determination
as to its impact on legislative enactments, necessarily involving an
in-depth study of legislative history, may prove to be more positive.
Only three states, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York have
had any significant number of exclusionary zoning decisions. Of
those, both New York and Pennsylvania had well-established doc
trines prior to the time that Mount Laurel was decided in New Jersey
in 1975.
Furthermore, Pennsylvania has held to its basic prodeveloper
theory that people have almost an unfettered right to do as they
please with their property. New Jersey's preoccupation with the
poor and other egalitarian concepts has been specifically rejected in
Pennsylvania by the Surrick decision.
176. Id at 16.
177. Id at 14.
178. 164 N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384 (Law Div. 1978).
179. Id at 575-76, 397 A.2d at 390-91.
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Though the New York decisions share greater brotherhood with
those of New Jersey than Pennsylvania, the New York approach pre
ceded, rather than followed Mount Laure/.
Perhaps equally significant is the fact that in New Jersey itself
there has been a substantial diminution of fervor, if not a downright
retreat, with respect to exclusionary zoning decisions. The New
Jersey courts have found that they are ill-equipped both in terms of
training, education, and staff resources, as well as hobbled by the
inherent limitations of the ad hoc decision process, to effectively as
sist replanning the state in the mold that the judiciary would like to
achieve.
If intervention into the local planning process is to prove effec
tive, it is believed clear that in New Jersey, and those states pursuing
the egalitarian concept, the answer should lie with the legislature
and not the judiciary.
An interesting story about the Pennsylvania version of the doc
trine has been told but not documented by a prominent law profes
sor active in the land use field. As the story goes, in a conversation
at a convention with one of the Justices ofthe Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, exclusionary litigation was reviewed in relation to existing
principles and doctrines. Subsequent to that general interchange of
views, including questions and analysis, the academic stated quite
candidly to the Justice: "Judge, you folks don't know what you're
doing." With becoming candor the Justice replied, "You're right but
we're going to force somebody to come up with a proper answer as to
what should be done."

